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Abstract

In 1974, a group of Mvskoke citizens from Oklahoma sued the federal government in federal court. Hanging
in the balance was the future of Mvskoke self-determination. The plaintiffs insisted that their 1867
Constitution remained in full effect, and that they still governed themselves pursuant to it. The United States
argued that the constitution had been nullified by federal law passed in the early 1900s.
To find in favor of the plaintiffs, the court would have to rule that the United States had been ignoring the
most basic civil rights of Mvskoke citizens and flouting the law for over seventy years. It would also have to
find that a tribal government had been operating legitimately in the shadows—that the Mvskoke people had
continued to operate under their constitution for most of the twentieth century despite official federal
antagonism. It was definitely a long shot, but they won.
This article explores factors that have helped the Mvskoke people create, nurture, and sustain a constitutional
government under hostile circumstances for centuries. We focus on the history and structure of the
constitutional government of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of Oklahoma. We consider several aspects of
Creek conceptions of government structure and balance, which are also evidenced in the constitutional
jurisprudence of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court. At first glance, the contemporary Mvskoke
government today bears little resemblance to the ancient etvlwv town-based system of governance, but a more
penetrating analysis reveals common threads of political theory and cosmogony, or world view, that have
continued unabated.
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MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE:
VHAKV EM PVTAKV1
(THE CARPET UNDER THE LAW)
Sarah Deer * and Cecilia Knapp **
PART I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, a group of Mvskoke 2 citizens from Oklahoma sued the federal government in federal court. 3 Hanging in the balance was the future of Mvskoke selfdetermination. The plaintiffs insisted that their 1867 Constitution remained in full effect,
and that they still governed themselves pursuant to it. The United States argued that the
constitution had been nullified by federal law passed in the early 1900s. 4
To find in favor of the plaintiffs, the court would have to rule that the United States
had been ignoring the most basic civil rights of Mvskoke citizens and flouting the law for
over seventy years. It would also have to find that a tribal government had been operating legitimately in the shadows—that the Mvskoke people had continued to operate un1. Vhakv em pvtakv is the Mvskoke phrase most often used to describe the written constitution. See infra
note 20 and accompanying text.
* Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. J.D., University of Kansas, 1999. Mvto (thank
you) to Rosemary McCombs Maxey, Ted Isham, Marcus Briggs-Cloud, Colette Routel, Rachel Kowarski,
Doug Heidenreich, Patrick Moore, Melissa Tatum, Frank Pommersheim, Mike Steenson, David Prince, Raleigh Levine, Niels Schaumann, Anna Light, Bethany Berger and Cal Bonde. While this co-author is a citizen
of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the opinions expressed in this article are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Nation or any of its officers or employers.
** J.D., 2013, William Mitchell College of Law.
2. “Creek,” “Muscogee,” and “Mvskoke” will be used interchangeably throughout this paper to refer to
the same nation of people. Mvskoke (pronounced muhs-GO-ghee) is the traditional word used to describe the
largest cultural group in the Creek Nation. There have been a variety of spellings of Mvskoke over the last two
centuries, including Muscogee, Muskogee, Muskoke, Maskoki and Maskoke. E.g., JACK B. MARTIN &
MARGARET MCKANE MAULDIN, A DICTIONARY OF CREEK/MUSKOGEE xiii (2000). Mvskoke is the preferred
spelling for many modern scholars and linguists. The spelling originates from a version of the alphabet adopted
by the Muscogee (Creek) Tribe in the late 1800s. PAMELA INNES ET AL., BEGINNING CREEK: MVSKOKE
EMPONVKV 3 (2004). The official federally recognized name of the tribal government described in this article
is Muscogee (Creek) Nation. However, some government offices are beginning to embrace the Mvskoke nomenclature in various significant publications (including the Supreme Court’s commissioned reporter). This
return to early spelling is typical of tribal nations engaged in cultural and linguistic revitalization. The word
“Creek” originated with the term the English used to identify the “Muskhogean group with whom they were
first in contact, the Indians who lived on or near the upper Ocmulgee, i.e., ‘Ochese on Creek.’” Verner W.
Crane, The Origin of the Name of the Creek Indians, 5 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 339, 342 (1918).
3. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.C. 1976). Harjo is a common Mvskoke surname (akin to the
American “Smith” or “Jones”) and will appear frequently in this article. The name is sometimes translated into
English as “crazy.” A more literal translation might be “recklessly brave.”
4. The United States argued that the Mvskoke right to self-government had been extinguished by federal
statute during the “allotment” era of Federal Indian law, when the federal government decided to compartmentalize tribal lands, distribute individual fee deeds to tribal members, and dissolve the tribal governments.
Id. at 1118.
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der their constitution for most of the twentieth century despite official federal antagonism.
It was definitely a long shot, but they won.
How did this tribal government continue to persevere and operate in spite of generations of official anti-tribal policies? In resolving the existential dispute, the federal
judge engaged the rich constitutional history of the Mvskoke people, 5 which dates back
at least 500 years. After reviewing this history, the court labeled the federal policies of
the United States as “bureaucratic imperialism.” 6 The court found that the “vigor and
liveliness of Creek political life,” 7 documented since the Revolutionary Era, had survived the destruction of the Creek National Council in the twentieth century, and continued uncowed in the decades since. 8 The decision led to a resurgence of Mvskoke political identity and a new constitution in 1979.
This article explores factors that have helped the Mvskoke people create, nurture,
and sustain a constitutional government under hostile circumstances for centuries. 9 We
focus on the history and structure of the constitutional government of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation of Oklahoma. 10 We consider several aspects of Creek conceptions of
government structure and balance, which are also evidenced in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court. At first glance, the contemporary Mvskoke government today bears little resemblance to the ancient etvlwv townbased system of governance, 11 but a more penetrating analysis reveals common threads
of political theory and cosmogony, or world view, that have continued unabated.
Despite the rapidly emerging field of tribal constitutional jurisprudence, there are
very few in-depth studies of how tribal governments interpret their own constitutions and
whether these interpretations have furthered the aim of tribal self-governance. Tribal
constitutional jurisprudence is “a unique contribution to the history of ideas,” and an essential element in the continuing tribal struggle for self-determination. 12 As explained by
Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred, “renewal of respect for traditional values is the only
lasting solution to the political, economic, and social problems that beset our people.” 13
This study does three things. It uncovers a distinctive constitutional tradition, chronicles
the role of law in the history of a people who struggled and survived in the face of relentless pressure to disappear, and helps to strengthen the foundation on which Mvskoke
people are building their future.
5. Id. at 1118-42.
6. Id. at 1130.
7. Id. at 1138.
8. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1138.
9. While we have researched the archival record of early Mvskoke law extensively, it is important to be
sensitive to the potential for observer bias, especially when relying on non-Native descriptions of tribal life.
10. Muscogee (Creek) Nation is the official name of the federally recognized tribal government headquartered in Okmulgee, Oklahoma. There are four other federally recognized tribal nations that share a common
origin: The Poarch Band of Creek Indians (Alabama), the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, the Seminole Nation
of Florida, and the Miccosukee Tribe (Florida). There are also “unrecognized” tribal nations that share a common heritage with the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 for a description of etvlwv structure.
12. TAIAIAKE ALFRED, PEACE, POWER, RIGHTEOUSNESS: AN INDIGENOUS MANIFESTO 5 (1999).
13. Id. Many tribal nations are “looking to the revitalization of Indigenous common law.” Joseph Thomas
Flies-Away et al., Native Nation Courts: Key Players in Nation Rebuilding, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS:
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 127 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007).
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Mvskoke constitutional law can be characterized as relatively young, but only if
the written form (which dates to the 1860s) is used as the standard. 14 Mvskoke constitutional structure actually has a lengthy, complex history that dates back to at least the
1500s. While a great deal of the structure has been heavily influenced by AngloAmerican law over the last 200 years, the Mvskoke philosophy of power balance is still
evident in the constitutional law of the Nation today.
In traditional, pre-removal Mvskoke society, maintaining harmony and sharing and
balancing power were central components of the Mvskoke cosmogony. These goals were
both important governmental pursuits, encompassing the management of conflict and the
prevention of abuse and manipulation of power and key elements in the structure of traditional government systems. The Mvskoke people have had intricate conceptions of vertical and horizontal power separation for centuries, and the Mvskoke government was
characterized by checks and balances, democratic offices, and a vigorous marketplace of
ideas long before the United States drafted the American Constitution. 15
To survive, however, the Mvskoke people and their constitutional structure had to
adapt. The resiliency of the government has been possible because of a series of adaptations and adjustments. 16 Mvskoke law has exhibited exceptional resilience in the face of
war, oppression, and coerced assimilation. 17 Its power and legitimacy is driven by a traditional embrace of political dialogue that seeks to balance the desire for conflict with
the necessity of finding balance and resolution in the midst of chaos and change.
Part II of this article begins with unwritten Mvskoke governance, showing the integration of the concept of balancing powers with Mvskoke cosmogony. Part III considers the development of the centralized Creek Confederacy, which developed as a response to European threats in present-day Alabama and Georgia. Part IV explores the
removal and re-establishment of the Creek Confederacy in Indian Territory after removal. Part V explores the post-U.S. Civil War experience, including the development of the
1867 Constitution and subsequent Creek Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 1867
Constitution. Part VI considers the devastating twentieth century history of the Creek
Nation and its re-emergence in the 1970s. Part VII reviews the decisions of the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court interpreting the 1979 Constitution. The article concludes
with an assessment of the strength of independent Mvskoke constitutional jurisprudence.
PART II: FOUNDATION: BCE-1832
The Mvskoke people ratified the first recorded written constitution in 1867. 18
14. Deloria and Lytle explain that “Indian tribes . . . had highly complicated forms of government that
could be traced far back into precontact days and, according to some tribal traditions, back as far as their creation and migration stories told them intelligible life has existed.” VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 81 (1983).
15. Alexander v. Gouge, 8 Okla. Trib. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2003).
16. Patrice Kunesh explains, “[a]s complex social systems, tribes have survived war, destitution, and denigration and have continually reconstructed their course and intention for the future.” Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 13
(2009).
17. CRAIG S. WOMACK, RED ON RED: NATIVE AMERICAN LITERARY SEPARATISM 31 (1999) (stating that
“Creeks provide an interesting historical example in terms of the way an indigenous culture might actually
flourish in the face of change”).
18. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of 1867 Constitution.
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However, that was not the first constitution that governed the Mvskoke people. We begin
by exploring fundamental social and political values of the Mvskoke culture. In order to
understand how the Mvskoke people may have conceived of, or responded to, the development of a written constitution, we must first understand the worldview of the drafters.
This cultural backdrop will also allow for a better understanding of how legal hegemony
may have affected constitutional principles identity over time.
A. Cultural Foundations of Mvskoke Governance
An exploration of Mvskoke constitutional law necessitates beginning with oral traditions that establish core political values. A “constitution” is “a society’s rules for making and enforcing its collective rules and decisions, including the legitimate allocation of
power and authority over rule-making and decision-making.” 19 In the Mvskoke language, the constitution is called vhakv em pvtakv or “the carpet under the law.” 20 A constitution, in other words, is the foundation for the entire legal system. Constitutions may
be written or unwritten; indeed, scholars have argued unwritten constitutional norms and
values may be more powerful because they reflect and are expressed in everyday activities as well as high level conflicts. 21
Political values in many cultures can be traced to pre-written symbols and myths. 22
Contemporary tribal governments have struggled to align these pre-written myths and
legends with their constitutional jurisprudence, as “federal policies of termination, relocation, and assimilation” have weakened, romanticized, and marginalized the importance
of the repositories of fundamental values. 23 This section uncovers those Mvskoke early
pre-written cultural norms, and shows how they help to form the “carpet under the law.”
Part of the cultural foundation for separate and decentralized powers in Mvskoke
government is reflected in a legend about two powerful, rival twins. 24 In this creation
story, these two twins struggled to balance their energies. After wrestling to the point of
exhaustion, their spirits led them up to the mists and clouds. 25 The more contemplative
19. Joseph Kalt, Constitutional Rule and the Effective Governance of Native Nations, in AMERICAN INDIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 184, 187 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006).
20. The authors are indebted to Rosemary McCombs Maxey for helping us understand the literal translation
of the phrase.
21. See Jane Pek, Things Better Left Unwritten?: Constitutional Text and the Rule of Law, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1979, 2002–03 (2008) (“Core parts of the unwritten constitution are rooted in custom, tradition, and precedent. Conventions, which have a much more significant role to play in an unwritten constitution, are predicated upon obedience and obligation—qualities that only become apparent over time and with consistent application of the convention in question”).
22. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 (1988) (“Essentially a people
share symbols and myths that provide meaning to their existence together and link them to some transcendent
order. They can thus act together and answer . . . basic political questions”).
23. Eric D. Lemont, Introduction, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING
OF NATIVE NATIONS 1, 4 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006).
24. There are many different versions of this story. In addition, because of the nature of oral tradition, it is
unlikely that a written English recounting of this Mvskoke story will be entirely accurate. Certainly much can
be lost in translation. For many indigenous people, reducing oral tradition to writing is problematic because the
codification process itself weakens the power and subtleties of the oral recitation. See, e.g., Christine Zuni
Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness [Re]Incorporating Customs and
Traditions
into
Tribal
Law,
TRIBAL
L.J.
(2009),
http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-lawjournal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/index.php.
25. JEAN CHAUDHURI & JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI, A SACRED PATH: THE WAY OF THE MUSCOGEE CREEKS
31 (2001).
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White Twin went one way, while the more aggressive and active Red Twin went another
way. 26 Each twin met groups of people who became their followers. 27 After reuniting,
the twins decided to bring the two groups, or worlds, together. 28 “One world was full of
active energy, but faced conflict without adequate ‘medicine,’ while the other had the
medicinal resources but lacked the organization to deal with external conflicts and the
extraction of medicine.” 29 “Together, they could be awesome.” 30
To join the peoples, Red Twin lobbied for a fight, whereas White Twin preferred
to talk things through in a council-like setting. 31 Ultimately, the twins decided to avoid
war and instead have the peoples play the “little brother of war,” a stick ball game. 32
Much negotiation ensued: Red tried to get White to settle on what weapons could be
used and the rules by which the game would be played, but White ended up leading the
dialogue and advocating for the avoidance of as much pain and suffering as possible. 33 In
this back-and-forth dialogue, each twin exhibited certain characteristics embedded in
Creek symbolism: “whites provide the long-term community-building and peace, while
the reds provide the activism, the security, and the energies for battle.” 34 When the symbolic war was over, “there was the coming together of a community based on reconciliation and love,” and the twins then descended from the mists back down to earth, “knowing the way of balancing and cooperation in human affairs.” 35
The red-white struggle and subsequent resolution explains a foundational tenet of
Mvskoke law: the search for balance and consensus is a primary virtue in government
and spiritual life. Appropriately, the seal of the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court is an
artist’s depiction of that mythical stickball game.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35, 41.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
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B. Structure and Function of Traditional Mvskoke Government
Long before the Mvskoke people had a written constitution, they had social and
political structures which formed the foundation of their government. Taken as a whole,
these structures can be considered a form of democracy, although “Creek democracy . . .
was not mob rule—the process of consent included interlinked centers of decisionmaking, with checks and balances apparently intended to avoid the development of a
permanent political elite.” 36 A key theme in Mvskoke governance, then, was not individualism but community balance. “The Creeks . . . depend[ed] on extensive notions of balance among different virtues, qualities, and functions.” 37 The traditional governing system of the Mvskoke people is complex. Perhaps the easiest starting point is to begin with
the way the identity of an individual Mvskoke person is inherited and related to others. 38

36. Id. at 73. Matthew L.M. Fletcher explains, “most Indian nations did not view government as a process
of coercion of the masses by an enlightened few.” MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW
1 (2011).
37. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 92.
38. We describe the Mvskoke clan identity in the present tense because this factor (and other traditions)
continues to be relevant to many Mvskoke people today. See Amelia Rector Bell, Separate People: Speaking of
Creek Men and Women, 92 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 332, 333 (1990). Womack and other indigenous theorists
suggest that using present tense in descriptions of cultural identifiers is important, especially in light of the fact
that “[t]he overwhelming majority of books written about Creeks are written by non-Native authors who write
in the past tense and assume that the people whom they are writing about no longer exist.” WOMACK, supra
note 17, at 28. In the Mvskoke language, there are four “past tenses,” which makes discussion about
past/present more nuanced than English.
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A basic understanding of the layers of Mvskoke identity will help demonstrate the
breadth of change and adaption over time, which provides a context to consider how the
contemporary written constitution may or may not reflect Mvskoke belief systems.
Each Mvskoke person identifies as a clan member, e.g., deer clan or wind clan. 39
Traditionally, each Mvskoke person also identified as a member of an etvlwv (town)
government. 40 The towns were self-governing, autonomous entities that would form the
basis for the Creek Confederacy. 41 Clans and towns were classified as either “red” or
“white”—a subdivision called “moiety” in Western anthropology. 42 Red towns were
primarily responsible for war and the white towns were responsible for peace, but because of the overlapping citizenship of the towns, every town had red and white families
who necessarily collaborated and competed for a role in the governance of the town. 43
This dynamic created a tradition of vigorous debate and is central to the resiliency of the
Mvskoke people. These debates have sometimes led to factionalism, violence, and even
civil war under the stress of occupation, removal, and civic disenfranchisement from the
United States.
The Creek Confederacy has traditionally been composed of red towns and white
towns, but members of red and white clans lived together within the towns. 44 Thus, clan
and moiety cut across geographical boundaries. These intricate interconnections were
inherent to the social system of the Mvskoke people. This created a system of overlapping alliances and loyalties that developed over centuries by the Mvskoke, ensuring a
balance of power within local government and across the Confederacy.
Each Mvskoke person was born with multiple roles and duties within the family,
the town, and potentially, within the confederacy, which encouraged vigorous civil engagement. 45 Many facets of identity are inherited, but heredity is not the only factor in
determining responsibilities within the government. 46 Age, gender, training, ability, and
military service are also considerations in identifying the unique, customized civic role. 47
Unlike modern constitutional legal systems, Mvskoke people carried their legal system
within themselves. By understanding Mvskoke cosmogony and legendary stories, citizens understood why the system was structured the way it was and their role in it; “[citizens] performing their assigned roles and educated accordingly made the system
work.” 48

39. George E. Lankford, Red and White: Some Reflections on Southeastern Symbolism, 50 S. FOLKLORE
53, 54 (1993).
40. Ross Hassig, Internal Conflict in the Creek War of 1813-1814, 21 ETHNOHISTORY 251, 252 (1974).
41. WOMACK, supra note 17, at 31.
42. Lankford, supra note 39, at 68.
43. Hassig, supra note 40, at 253-54.
44. Id. at 252; Lankford, supra note 39, at 74-75.
45. “Factionalism . . . was encouraged rather than discouraged.” STEVEN C. HAHN, THE INVENTION OF THE
CREEK NATION, 1670-1763, at 95 (2004).
46. Corkran identifies three key factors in the power structure of this model—age/service; heredity; and
service to the people. DAVID H. CORKRAN, THE CREEK FRONTIER, 1540-1783, at 23 (1967).
47. See CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 77-80.
48. Id. at 76.
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1. Clan
A Mvskoke person inherits primary identity—clan membership—from her or his
maternal family. 49 Clans, which form the foundation of identity and Mvskoke relationships, first appeared in Mvskoke genesis stories and have no true parallel in AngloAmerican law. 50 Clan structure is closely intertwined with spiritual and civic (legal) duties. 51 Thus, an individual learns her or his inherited civic responsibility from childhood.
Today there are nine Mvskoke clans, but originally there were between twenty-five and
twenty-seven clans. 52 The interrelationships and kinship networks established in the clan
system served as an early form of political checks and balances in Mvskoke society. 53
The blood relationship that ties members of a clan together was stronger than any other
form of affiliation or membership. 54 Traditionally, relationships between clans were
strictly regulated. 55 Clans also created extended kin networks that would be recognized
wherever an individual traveled. 56 This familial interconnectedness often served to temper conflict between two or more political divisions.
The intricate kinship rules and regulations of clan membership provided the structure for domestic governance, including rules for marriage, divorce, child custody, and
interpersonal crime. 57 The basic domestic unit was known as a huti, which included not
49. INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 72; see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA: THE
CREEKS 23 (1990) [hereinafter GREEN, THE CREEKS].
50. Deloria and Lytle write:
The primacy of the Creek clans, for example, could be traced back to an early condition
of chaos in which humans and animals were lost in an immensely thick fog. In order to
save themselves the people and the animals joined hands and wandered for many days.
Finally, as the fog was clearing and open skies could be discerned, they agreed that
henceforth the clans would rank in the order in which they had emerged from the dreadful fog. Such a tradition clearly ranks with the Exodus and other stories cherished by the
Western peoples, extending significantly far into the past, as a revered explanation of the
manner in which the Creek Nation organized itself.
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 14, at 81–82.
51. See CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 76.
52. INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 72. The contemporary clans are Wind (Hotvlkvlke), Alligator (Hvlpvtvlke), Bear (Nokosvlke), Tiger (Kaccvlke), Deer (Ecovlke), Sweet Potato (Vhvlvkvlke), Raccoon (Wotkvlke),
Beaver (Echaswvlke), and Bird (Foswvlke). Id. See also CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 21
(“[t]welve clans were created at first”); John R. Swanton, A Foreword on the Social Organization of the Creek
Indians, 14 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 593, 594 (1912) (naming 25 clans).
53. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 92.
54. “The strongest link in their political and social standing as a nation is in their clanship or families. By
their observances of it they are so united that there is no part of the nation detached from the other, but are all
linked harmonised [sic] and consolidated as one large connected family.” CAMERON BRAXTON WESSON,
HOUSEHOLDS AND HEGEMONY: EARLY CREEK PRESTIGE GOODS, SYMBOLIC CAPITAL, AND SOCIAL POWER 2425 (1997). Clans themselves were categorized as white or red. DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL ORDER AND
POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS AMONG THE CHEROKEE, THE CHOCTAW, THE
CHICKASAW, AND THE CREEK 42 (1992). White clans generally performed domestic, internal governance. Red
clans generally provided law enforcement and military protection. White clans and towns were authoritative in
times of peace; red clans and red towns were authoritative in times of war. JOEL W. MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT:
THE MUSKOGEES’ STRUGGLE FOR A NEW WORLD 82 (1991) [hereinafter MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT].
55. Intra-clan marriages, for example, were forbidden (and considered a form of incest). ANGIE DEBO, THE
ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS 16 (1941).
56. See Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., The Destruction of the Creek Confederacy, in FORKED TONGUES AND
BROKEN TREATIES 78 (Donald E. Worcester ed., 1975) (“Without a doubt, clan loyalty took precedence over
town or even tribal loyalty”). For example, a bear clan member from one etvlwv would owe certain responsibilities and respect to bear clan members residing in any other etvlwv.
57. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM.
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only nuclear family members, but also extended kinship. 58 A group of huti created a political/social organization known as an etvlwv, the most important political unit in the
pre-constitutional era.
2. Etvlwv (Town)
After clan identity, the etvlwv 59 was historically the most “potent political identifier” in Mvskoke culture. 60 Each etvlwv was made up of twenty-five to one hundred houses nearly always geographically placed near a river or a stream. 61 “[H]eredity and traditions” united the people of an etvlwv. 62 The Mvskoke people physically centered each
etvlwv around a sacred fire, which they ceremonially extinguished and renewed each
year.
Because there was no centralized government, each etvlwv operated an independent government, which usually met daily. 63 These governments were not comprised of
“insulated compartments”; nor did they have a “permanent, separate bureaucracy.” 64
However, there were some consistent features including parallels to executive, legislative, and judicial functions.
For each etvlwv, there was a head executive known as a mekko. 65 A typical etvlwv
277, 297 (1993):
Political rights and responsibilities arise from genealogy and are highly differentiated.
Kinship assigns fixed roles to individuals, as if they were species in an ecosystem. At the
same time, each individual plays multiple roles in relation to others: as a father to one,
uncle to another, cousin to still another. Thus, a tribal political system is a web of reciprocal relationships without a separately institutionalized “state.”
58. ROBBIE ETHRIDGE, CREEK COUNTRY: THE CREEK INDIANS AND THEIR WORLD 74 (2003).
59. Pronounced DULL-wah (leading e is silent). Alternate spelling includes tvlwv, talwa, etulwa, or etawla.
English and Americans typically translated this term as town or village. A more accurate translation would be
“nation.” Referring to the etvlwv as a town implies a degree of inferiority. Mvto to Marcus Briggs-Cloud for
providing more context for this word.
60. ANGELA PULLEY HUDSON, CREEK PATHS AND FEDERAL ROADS: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND SLAVES IN
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 3 (2010). See also Joel W. Martin, Rebalancing the World in the Contradictions of History: Creek/Muskogee, in NATIVE RELIGIONS AND CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA:
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SACRED 85, 94 (Lawrence E. Sullivan ed., 2000) [hereinafter Martin, Rebalancing the
World]. MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 50; WOMACK, supra note 17, at 35.
61. DeRosier, supra note 56, at 74; see DEBO, supra note 55, at 9; see also SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 22 (1989).
62. Morris Edward Opler, The Creek “Town” and the Problem of Creek Indian Political Reorganization, in
HUMAN PROBLEMS IN TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A CASEBOOK 165, 170 (Edward H. Spicer ed., 1952). A
woman retained the tribal town affiliation of her mother and husbands took on the etvlwv identity of their
wives. Bell, supra note 38, at 333.
63. WILLIAM BARTRAM, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CREEK AND CHEROKEE INDIANS 23 (1789); see also
Ohland Morton, The Government of the Creek Indians, 8 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 42, 42 (1930).
64. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 76, 92.
65. Also spelled micco or miko. See, e.g., THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE
TO AMERICAN INDIANS OF THE SOUTHEAST 48 (2001). A mekko (almost always male) often inherits his position from a maternal uncle, but the leadership position is not strictly hereditary. English speakers often used the
word “king” to describe this position, but the mekko role was actually nothing like that of a European monarch.
See DONALD E. GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE 5-6 (1973) [hereinafter GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE]; see also
CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 76 (“community acceptance determined whether one became a
micco”). Other English translations include “chief” and “mayor.” Today, a traditional mekko is a lifetime position. George Thompson, Statement From Hickory Ground Chief George Thompson Regarding Poarch Creek’s
Digging
up
of
Remains,
INDIAN
COUNTRY
TODAY
(Sept.
7,
2012),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/statement-from-hickory-ground-chief-george-thompsonregarding-poarch-creeks-digging-up-of-remains-133259. A mekko is “a person who had achieved great honor
and trust” who “ruled by persuasion, not command or coercion.” See, e.g., PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at
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also has three tiers of male leaders or advisors, which traditionally performed more legislative functions. 66 Historically, the mekko would select a tvstvnvke (war chief) from one
of the red clans, who served as chief advisor on military and law enforcement matters. 67
From one of the white clans, the mekko would select one or more hennehas (spiritual
leader), who exercised administrative domestic powers, such as building homes and
farming. 68 Typically, one henneha served as the “speaker” for the mekko. 69 The mekko
also selected a third group of advisors, known as vcakvlke (“beloved old men”), for their
wisdom achieved through age and service. 70 The etvlwv leaders did not adjudicate interpersonal disputes, but focused on the administration of the local government, including
food distribution, agricultural planning, and security. 71
In traditional, pre-removal 72 Mvskoke government, there was no formal separate or
neutral judiciary. Clan and household negotiations resolved inter-clan and intra-clan disputes involving matters of injury and personal property. 73 A system of councils, including the family, the clan, or the etvlwv oversaw inter-clan dispute resolution. 74 The Nation’s current Supreme Court explained that “[u]nder traditional Mvskoke law,
controversies were resolved by clan Vculvkvlke (elders). Their integrity was considered
beyond reproach. “They were obligated by the responsibilities of their position to decide
cases fairly, and honestly, regardless of clan or family affiliation.” 75
Because Mvskoke people valued consensus, the most important skill a political
leader could possess was oratory. 76 Lengthy speeches were the hallmark of an effective
civic leader, and most decisions were not made until after all leaders had an opportunity

48 (“Chiefs earned their positions by their accomplishments rather than inheriting rank by birth”). See also
O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22. A mekko often worked with a second mekko (mekko vpoktv or “twin chief”).
ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 102. Thus, local town structure could be said to have a dual executive. This concept of dual executive later was incorporated into the Creek Confederacy. See discussion infra Part II.C.
66. Mvskoke women were often assumed to be politically powerless by early European observers. EuroAmerican observers came from a world in which women did not govern—so the activities of women would not
be as keenly watched. However, Mvskoke women were the actual owners of the land. Thus, they had significant political power that was exercised in that context. At the very least, there is evidence clan matriarchs did
exercise political influence. The word “beloved” is used to describe these Creek matriarchs, and the word “beloved” generally was used to describe officials associated with the white moiety. Ethridge explains, “[a]lthough
they had no official voice, southeastern Indian women influenced public opinion and councils by influencing
their male kin through informal channels.” ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105; see also CHAUDHURI &
CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 50 (“While men had the edge in actual fighting, women had the edge in actual
authority. Together they worked toward bringing harmony in the midst of the imperfections of life”); PERDUE
& GREEN, supra note 65, at 48.
67. O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 23; see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 102.
71. See Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
17, 18-19 (1974).
72. Most Mvskoke people were forced to relocate to Indian Territory in the early nineteenth century. Thus,
“pre-removal” refers to the government prior to the relocation. See discussion infra Part IV.
73. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 91.
74. Id. at 90–91.
75. In re The Practice of Law Before the Courts of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 9 Okla. Trib. 31, 33 (S.
Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2005). This is a rare but important example of the contemporary court using Mvskoke language in its decision.
76. ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105. Ethridge describes the Creek people as “famously argumentative.” Id.
at 108.
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to speak without time limits until consensus could be reached. 77 Election or appointment
to political office was done by voting in public—not by secret ballot. 78 When disputes
between members of an etvlwv, or between two different etvlwv could not be resolved
through consensus, a typical response was to withdraw and separate. 79 Sometimes members who withdrew would establish a new etvlwv. 80 Thus, historical records demonstrate
the spontaneous creation of new etvwlv as well as the merging of two more etvlwv.
3. Moieties— Semi-Divisions
As noted previously, the Mvskoke people traditionally classified both towns and
clans as white or red. 81 Both white and red clans lived in each etvlwv, and the leading
clan determined the color of the etvlwv. These colors symbolized the primary role of the
town or clan—association with foreign powers or domestic powers. 82 The clans and
towns affiliated with the color red performed external relations duties (including military
defense, diplomacy, and commerce), whereas clans and towns affiliated with the color
white performed domestic duties (including ceremonies, family law, crime, probate, and
making of peace). 83
Mvskoke cosmogony stressed the importance of separation of powers between military and civilian leaders. 84 This division of military and treaty power was especially important for the balance of power. 85 While the military branch engaged in physical warfare, the peace-making branch worked toward ultimate resolution. “[R]eckless rashness”
was expected of young warriors. 86 However, Mvskoke people were also expected to mature and develop “moderation and wisdom” later in life. 87 In the European construct of
war, a military leader could accept a surrender or negotiate a truce. Not so for the
Mvskoke. Normally, the mekkos from the white clans in white etvlwv governments
would draft peace agreements and terms of disengagement. The tension between the
white and red towns, then, served a functional purpose. The rivalry resulted in vigorous
debates about matters of national security and a role for cooler heads to prevail in negoti77. See id. at 105. Consensus is a recurrent theme in tribal law. See Robert D. Cooter & Woflgang
Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
287, 319 (1998).
78. John H. Moore, The Mvskoke National Question in Oklahoma, 52 SCI. & SOC’Y 163, 166-67 (1988).
79. ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 96.
80. Id.
81. See MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 40 (“The distinguishing colors were painted on buildings and ceremonial articles and used in bodily decoration”); see also Opler, supra note 62, at 171-72.
82. O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22. Sometimes these colors are referred to as “war” or “peace” colors but in
practice these divisions were not always so polarized. PATRICIA RILES WICKMAN, THE TREE THAT BENDS:
DISCOURSE, POWER, AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE MASKOKI PEOPLE 48 (1999); see also CHAUDHURI &
CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 38 (noting that “in Creek symbolism the white sticks provide the long-run
community-building and peace, while the reds provide the activism, the security, and the energies for battle.”).
83. See, e.g., BARTRAM, supra note 63, at 61 (“Whenever the question of war or peace was discussed in the
national council, it was the duty of the white towns to bring forward all the arguments which could be adduced
in favor of peace.”). Within such domestic realms, it was unusual for a person affiliated with a red town to have
a say in domestic matters. See DeRosier, supra note 56, at 73; see also Mary R. Haas, Creek Inter-Town Relations, 42 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 479, 484-85 (1940).
84. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 14, at 85-86.
85. CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 30.
86. Id. at 25.
87. Id. at 26.
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ating terms of peace. Philosophically, Mvskoke governments did not seek to initiate or
sustain war. Governing structures worked together for wholeness. Wholeness was conceived as a balance between red “war” spirit and white “peace” spirit. 88
C. Creek Confederacy
The colonial historical records refer to the predecessor of the contemporary
Mvskoke governments as the “Creek Confederacy.” 89 The autonomous etvwlv governments created this Confederacy in response to external threats. While there was no written constitution governing the activities of the early Confederacy, there were clear constitutional principles at play—including division of powers and organized law-making. 90
1. Early Period: 1500s-1776
Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Mvskoke etvlwv governments and
allied tribal communities formalized a union which would ultimately come to be known
as the Creek Confederacy. 91 Historians disagree about exactly when the Creek Confederacy evolved into a political entity, but most surmise that the various etvlwv governments
of the Creek Confederacy were loosely organized prior to the arrival of Europeans. 92
Lewis and Kneberg claim that “[l]ong before Columbus, they organized a great confederacy that included more than a dozen Muskhogean tribes, and others as well.” 93 The earliest European contact with Mvskoke people happened in the early sixteenth century with

88. Martin, Rebalancing the World, supra note 60, at 92.
89. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 60, at 8. Originally, Mvskoke cultural groups (understood as organized
groups of matrilineal clans) occupied a significant portion of southeastern North America—today Alabama,
Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina. Barbara Alice Mann, “A Man of Misery”: Chitto Harjo and the Senate
Select Committee on Oklahoma Statehood, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPEAKERS OF THE EASTERN WOODLANDS:
SELECTED SPEECHES AND CRITICAL ANALYSES 197, 197 (Barbara Alice Mann ed., 2001). Mvskoke people
historically lived throughout at least a 62,000 square mile region, but by the 1600s had settled on an approximately 500 square mile area in present-day Alabama and Georgia. HUDSON, supra note 60, at 3. Because identification with the Creek confederacy was a fluid phenomenon, population estimates also vary. The estimates
range from 7,000-35,000 people living in between sixty and ninety political units. The difficulty in defining the
precise history of the Creek Confederacy is illustrated by the following examples. David Corkran claims that
7,000-9,000 Mvskoke people lived in approximately sixty towns. CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 6. Bolster claims
25,000-35,000 Mvskoke people were loosely organized in the 1780s. Mel H. Bolster, The Smoked Meat Rebellion, 31 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 37, 40 (1953). Duane Champagne asserts that there were originally eighty to ninety
towns. CHAMPAGNE, supra note 54, at 37.
90. JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI, FOUNDING AMERICA: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF RIGHTS, RELIGION,
COMMERCE, AND DIVERSITY 13 (1992) (explaining that the Creek Confederacy “demonstrated a complex system of balanced authority”).
91. “Regardless of its precise origin, the Confederacy is considered the hallmark of the Creek strategy for
cultural survival during the historic period.” WESSON, supra note 54, at 44. John H. Moore writes that the
Mvskoke word for the confederacy may have been “etelaketa.” Moore, supra note 78, at 170. There is no precise English translation for this word, but a loose English translation would be “The People Sitting Together.”
See e-mail from Rosemary McCombs Maxey, to author (Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with author).
92. See, e.g., INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 28; see also William C. Sturtevant, Creek into Seminole, in
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 92, 93 (Eleanor Burke Leacock & Nancy Oestreich
Lurie eds., 1971). But see Vernon James Knight, Jr., The Formation of the Creeks, in THE FORGOTTEN
CENTURIES: INDIANS AND EUROPEANS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1521-1704 , at 373, 375 (Charles Hudson &
Carmen Chaves Tesser eds., 1994) (claiming that “[t]here is no documentary evidence of any such political
centralization prior to the eighteenth century.”).
93. THOMAS M.N. LEWIS & MADELINE KNEBERG, TRIBES THAT SLUMBER: INDIANS OF THE TENNESSEE
REGION 93 (1958).

2013]

MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

135

the exploits of Hernando De Soto of Spain. 94 Spanish Conquistadors devastated
Mvskoke populations through violence and disease in the sixteenth century. 95 The surviving Mvskoke continued their etvwlv governments where possible, but many had to
merge together for protection and survival.
Spanish tyranny continued to threaten the Mvskoke way of life throughout most of
the seventeenth century. 96 The newer English colonies on the east coast seemed less
threatening, so Mvskoke leaders began to enter into agreements with the English.
Charles Town, established in 1670 by English immigrants in the Carolina colony, was
likely the first permanent European settlement in Mvskoke Territory. 97 It was during this
time period that the Confederacy first appeared as a legal entity in historical documents. 98
The Confederacy was originally a cooperative agreement among several tribes
with different languages and traditions. 99 The Creek Confederacy included Mvskoke
etvwlv governments, but also a variety of allied cultural groups. 100 Today, the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation government presents confederacy history, and explains that “the
[C]onfederation was also expanded by the addition of tribes conquered by towns of the
[C]onfederacy, and, in time, by the incorporation of tribes and fragments of tribes devastated by the European imperial powers.” 101
A confederated government was seen as necessary for foreign relations once European settlement took hold. However, Mvskoke people remained more likely to identify
with their etvlwv than with the Confederacy. Only in times of international crisis did
Mvskoke people refer to themselves as “Creeks.” 102 The early Confederacy did adopt
94. Moore writes that “De Soto encountered at least three etvlwvs (towns) in 1540—Chiaha, Koasati and
Tulsa.” Moore, supra note 78, at 164. Mvskoke jurist Patrick Moore writes, “[m]any of these towns visited by
Hernando De Soto in the summer of 1539 were later abandoned or simply ceased to exist due to De Soto’s
ruthless military exploitation or the effects of diseases brought to the ‘New World’ by his soldiers and servants.” Patrick Edward Moore, Muscogee (Creek) Government Pre-Columbian to 2005, in 1 MVSKOKE LAW
REPORTER, at XI (Melissa L. Tatum & Michelle Grunstad eds., 2005) [hereinafter Moore, Government PreColumbian].
95. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 138; GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 17–18. Disease included smallpox, measles, and influenza. Martin, Rebalancing the World, supra note 60, at 92.
96. CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 48.
97. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 27.
98. By 1789, Bartram, an English botanist, declared the Creeks to be “a very powerful Confederacy.” Bartram, supra note 63, at 11. Deloria and Lytle conclude that the formation of the Confederacy was necessarily
colored by the contact with Europeans: “The Creeks . . . evolved toward the European style of political organization because it was simpler to do so and because the preservation of the peace with European powers made it
necessary.” DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 14, at 86.
99. “The confederacy united diverse [etvlwvs or towns] for larger objectives, including wars with other
polities over contested territories and hunting grounds.” MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 50.
100. Corkran, for example, explains, “Creeks had a genius for taking fragments of other tribes under their
wing.” CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 4. More than five languages were spoken in the Confederacy as of the late
16th century. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 20 (“[t]here were perhaps six distinct languages spoken
among the Creeks”); see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 30. Scholars have suggested that the Confederacy is
a bona fide political alliance (as opposed to a group of culturally affiliated sub-groups) because of linguistic
diversity. See GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 4-5. Allied towns did not always share a common
language, but nonetheless agreed to partner in important military alliances. The Confederacy was more likely a
blend of cultural and political authority (particularly since the Mvskoke cosmogony does not separate spiritual
and secular authority).
101. Muscogee (Creek) Nation History, MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION, http://www.muscogeenationnsn.gov/Pages/History/history.html (last visited June 8, 2013).
102. ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 93.
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some national legislation, 103 but its primary purpose was to address foreign relationships
in both war and peace with European governments. 104 Throughout the 1700s and 1800s,
the Creek Confederacy made treaties with the British, Spanish, French, and American
governments. 105
The treaty decision-making body for the Confederacy was often referred to as
“Grand Council” and the leaders came together annually (or more often if needed). The
Creek Confederacy governed by consent. Each individual etvlwv government retained
independence and autonomy, and its leaders had the freedom to choose whether to send
representatives to participate in the Grand Council each year. 106 Like the etvlwv governments, the Confederacy had constitutional elements, although the structure was never put
to writing. But some Confederation-wide policies and protocols were widely followed,
which led to comprehensive policies on diplomacy and war. The common cultural ideals
“gave some substance to the central Creek set of governmental and normative umbrellas
without a central bureaucracy.” 107
Each etvlwv in the Confederacy could send representatives to the Grand Council.
Representatives from red towns became known among Europeans as “Warriors” and representatives from the white towns were known as “Kings.” 108 The Confederacy’s structure itself was set up in a similar manner to that of a typical etvlwv government. 109 Three
categories of leaders made up the National Council: the mekkos (chiefs), the vcakvlke
(beloved men), and the henehas (spiritual leaders). 110 While it was not typical for the
Creeks to recognize only a single chief, American and European leaders often singled
out a particular mekko who was called mekko rakko, or “big chief.” 111
The laws issued by the Grand Council were only binding insofar as the autono-

103. See, e.g., Lester Hargrett, The Creek (or Muskogee) Nation, in A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION
78 (1947).
104. Alexander v. Gouge, 8 Okla. Trib. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2003). The Court’s
finding reflects most of the history on the matter. See, e.g., DEBO, supra note 55, at 6; Knight, supra note 92, at
386; Lester Eugene Robbins, The Persistence of Traditional Religious Practices Among Creek Indians 88-89
(1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University) (on file with Southern Methodist University). The Confederacy began meeting annually in the eighteenth century. Prior to that, there was little need
for regular meetings. See also HUDSON, supra note 60, at 64.
105. INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 28. Some of these treaties included: Oglethorpe’s Treaty with the Lower
Creek Indians, 4 GA. HIST. Q. 3 (1920); Treaty with Spain (Oct. 28, 1793); Treaty of Pensacola with Spain
(1784); Treaty of Coweta with the Creeks with British (1739); Treaty with the British (1733) (signed May 21,
ratified by British colony of Georgia, Oct. 18). It is clear that various etvlwv governments individually approved of treaties before they were ratified. When it came to one particular agreement with England, a Creek
chief named Tomochichi traveled to England in 1734, and gave a bundle of eagle feathers to King George II,
explaining that “these feathers are a sign of peace in our land and have been carried from town to town there
and we have brought them over to leave with you, O Great King, as a sign of everlasting peace.” O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 120. See also CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 140; CORKRAN, supra note 46, at
87.
106. See ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 96.
107. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 69.
108. MELISSA L. TATUM & MICHELLE GRUNSTED, 5 MVSKOKE LAW REPORTER vii (Melissa L. Tatum &
Michelle Grunsted eds., 2005); J.N.B. Hewitt, Notes on the Creek Indians, 123 SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
BUREAU OF AM. ETHNOLOGY BULL. 119, 139-41 (1939) (The “Kings” and “Warriors” nomenclature was used
in the 1867 Constitution); See discussion infra Part IV.A.
109. GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 17.
110. O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22-23.
111. See CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 75. This position later became known as Principal
Chief in the 1867 Constitution.
AND LAWS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 78,
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mous towns chose to honor them. 112 This pluralistic view of law and sovereignty establishes a different set of principles than that used in the American system. American federalism is non-negotiable once states join the union. 113 The centralized government does
not allow constituent states to engage and disengage at will. Mvskoke cosmogony sees
things differently:
The cosmogony of the [Mvskoke] peoples was and is a circular one
that makes allies of humans and nature. Therefore, the natural propensity of all elements is movement in concert, but this movement implies
no direction, linear or otherwise. In this world view, all creatures and
events have an ab initio right to being, and a consequent right to acceptance. 114
The fluidity of this governmental structure was reflected in the functional structure
of the confederacy. For example, there was no static geographic capital. The seat of the
confederate governments rotated depending on the home etvlwv of the presiding chief. 115
Political power was largely decentralized, and local governments maintained authority
over their own citizens.
The town councils held influence over the town’s inhabitants only. The
National Council, in contrast, made decisions for the entire body of
Creek towns. Like the town councils, its power was minimal. Nevertheless, the European governments used it to represent the decisions of
all the Creek people. Clearly, in many cases, it did not represent the
desires of the common Creek people. 116
It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the jurisprudence of judicial decision
makers in this time period because there are no written records other than the treaties that
the Mvskoke leaders signed. However, given the complexity of kinship and etvlwv relationships, it is probable that those roles and duties provided some foundation for resolving structural disputes.

112. Tatum and Grunsted state:
The pre-removal Grand Council met in the tribal towns periodically to discuss the many
issues facing the Confederacy. Most often, the Houses met separately in one tribal square
and then combined in an almost ritualistic ceremony to discuss what the Creek Nation
should do in light of input from the Houses. Often, towards the end of the late 1700s, the
Council would discuss Treaties offered by neighboring tribes and the Federal Government.
TATUM & GRUNSTED, supra note 108, at vii.
113. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
114. WICKMAN, supra note 82, at 16–17.
115. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 71; CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 4; DEBO, supra note 55,
at 7; GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 18–19; HEWITT, supra note 108, at 125; DeRosier, supra
note 56, at 73.
116. H. THOMAS FOSTER II, ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE LOWER MUSKOGEE CREEK INDIANS, 1715-1836, at 16
(2007); see also Hewitt, supra note 108, at 139-41.
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2. Middle Period: 1776-1811
By the end of the eighteenth century, trade and diplomacy were still exercised in
large part through autonomous etvlwv governments. 117 After the American Revolution,
the Creek Confederacy faced a number of new challenges. 118 First, Mvskoke people had
become increasingly reliant on trade with Europeans. 119 In addition, American leaders
began to negotiate and trade almost exclusively with red clans from red towns. 120
Whether Europeans elevated red leaders above white leaders through ignorance or strategy, the practice disrupted the traditional power structure that distinguished between military and civilian duties. 121 Giving red leaders a disproportionate stake in trade created
conflicts of interest as traditional agents of national security, while marginalizing white
leaders’ traditional role as agents of commerce.
This disregard for the delicate balance of powers exacerbated tensions between the
red and white moieties. 122 Disagreements among Mvskoke people about assimilation aggravated these tensions and stoked the threat of civil war. Moiety divisions, once a
source of strength and diversity for Mvskoke people, paralyzed the council during the
early part of the nineteenth century. 123
In addition, early American government agents began to put immense pressure on
the leaders of the Creek Confederacy to adopt the customs, economy, religion, and political structure of Euro-Americans. Benjamin Hawkins was the first full-time federal agent
assigned to negotiate with the Creeks in 1796. 124 Hawkins sought to change Mvskoke
life by creating a centralized government. 125 He set out by abolishing the distinction between red and white towns. Under his direction, all etvlwv governments were characterized as “red.” 126 He also began the American tradition of ignoring Mvskoke chains-of-

117. HUDSON, supra note 60, at 12.
118. The original Articles of Confederation did not clearly establish the relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes. In 1781, when the Constitution was established, Congress was explicitly given
the authority to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
119. Douglas Barber, Council Government and the Genesis of the Creek War, 38 ALA. REV. 163, 164
(1985). Creek dependence on European goods such as firearms and cooking utensils began early in the seventeenth century and gradually weakened Creek economic power. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 32–35.
Dependency was intentionally introduced in order to leverage land claims.
120. CHAMPAGNE, supra note 54, at 113; CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 27.
121. See MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 82.
122. For example, when red clans controlled the actions of an etvlwv, the white clans were not able to perform certain peacetime ceremonies. Martin, Rebalancing the World, supra note 60, at 95-96.
123. See generally Barber, supra note 119.
124. DEBO, supra note 55, at 66; see generally THE COLLECTED WORKS OF BENJAMIN HAWKINS, 1796-1810
(Thomas Foster ed., 2003). Hawkins’ office, like all Indian Affairs positions, was housed in the War Department. Hawkins was personally selected for the role by President George Washington with a clear objective to
“civilize” the Creek Indians. MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 87. Hawkins actually boasted that he
created the National Council himself. ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105. Under Hawkins’ authority, agricultural
productivity, English language acquisition, and conversion to Christianity became priorities. Martin notes, “[i]t
is clear that the aims and intents of the plan of civilization put into practice the expansionist policies officially
promulgated by high government officials, including George Washington, Henry Knox, and Thomas Jefferson.” MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 94.
125. Moore, supra note 78; see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 13 (“The plan for civilization was official
policy, formulated by George Washington, Henry Knox, Thomas Jefferson, and other statesmen, to assimilate
Indians into American society.”). The “hidden hand behind the plan for civilization was U.S. Expansion.” Id. at
15; see also William W. Savage, Creek Colonization in Oklahoma, 54 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 34 (1976).
126. DEBO, supra note 55, at 67; see also CHAMPAGNE, supra note 54, at 113–14.
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command in the Confederacy and negotiating with a few select leaders. One such select
leader was Alexander McGillivray, who served as a puppet leader under Hawkins’ control. 127 Hawkins and McGillivray implemented radical changes, including “a unified foreign policy” and a “centralized administration” 128 for the Creek Confederacy. As the
central bureaucracy strengthened, so too did the power of the centralized government to
enforce laws normally administered by etvlwv governments. 129 For example, under the
American-influenced Confederacy, a cultural and spiritual practice known as busketa, 130
practiced for millennia at the etvlwv level, became a national event, with the central government as enforcer of attendance. This action was the first recorded domestic police
power exercised by the Confederacy. 131 Hawkins also used McGillivray to manipulate
the agenda of the National Council and prioritize activities that increased trade with
Americans. 132
Centralizing power in a single entity was troubling to many traditional Mvskoke
people. One of the strengths of the Creek Confederacy had been the freedom and liberty
that its fluid structure allowed. Concentrating power in the hands of a small number of
people ran counter to the cultural beliefs of the Mvskoke people and threatened the very
fabric of Mvskoke society. As relations among the Mvskoke people grew strained, a
long-standing geographical schism took on greater political overtones. The etvlwv governments in the west (called Upper Creeks) generally advocated for a conservative perspective, maintaining traditional Mvskoke culture and practices, while the etvlwv governments in the east (called Lower Creeks) supported conversion to Christianity and the
adoption of Anglo-American practices. 133
3. Late Period: 1811-1832
The Upper/Lower Creek factional division ultimately resulted in a civil war, the
Red Stick War, which lasted from 1811-1814, and left tremendous divisions within the
Creek Confederacy. 134 As part of its prosecution of the War of 1812, the British stirred
up anti-American sentiment among Creeks and encouraged them to defy the United
States. Upper Creeks were also heavily influenced by the Shawnee/Creek leader Tecumseh, who urged all tribal governments to actively resist assimilation. 135 Mvskoke follow127. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 140–41. “McGillivray was only one-quarter Creek, for
his mother was half-Creek and his father was full-blood Scot . . . McGillivray was, in part, a creation of the
English and used his English connections to gain prestige and power.” Id.
128. DEBO, supra note 55, at 39; PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85.
129. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85 (noting that in the late 1790s, “the Creeks reorganized their national council, announced laws against theft, and created a special police force to enforce them”).
130. Today, colloquially referred to as Green Corn ceremonies.
131. It would have been highly unusual (in most cases, forbidden) for a Mvskoke person to fail to participate
in the annual busketa ceremony for his/her etvlwv (town). Thus, the national policy may have seemed to be
“effective” in that people were already participating despite the national law. See John R Swanton, The Green
Corn Dance, 10 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 170, 177–78 (1932).
132. ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105-07.
133. This description is over-simplistic. For example, there were also blood quantum differences. Chaudhuri
and Chaudhuri also suggest that “lower creeks” included more mixed-bloods than the “upper creeks”.
CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 71.
134. Barber, supra note 119.
135. See, e.g., GREGORY A. WASELKOV, A CONQUERING SPIRIT: FORT MIMS AND THE REDSTICK WAR OF
1813-1814 (2006).
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ers of Tecumseh advocated the overthrow of leaders loyal to Benjamin Hawkins. 136
Many etvlwv governments were divided internally. 137 In the end, the Lower Creeks
aligned with the U.S. military, led by future President Andrew Jackson, and ended the
war by slaughtering the rebellious Creeks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. 138 The result
was the 1814 Treaty of Fort Jackson, which included the cession of nearly two-thirds of
Creek lands. 139
The victorious Creeks aligned more directly with U.S. agents. Americans supported Lower Creek leaders, such as William McIntosh, whose father was Scottish, and who
advocated for assimilation and acculturation. Lower Creeks also developed plantation
economies and many became owners of African slaves. 140 Despite these assimilation efforts, the United States continued to demand the cession of more territory “as restitution
for damages made to American settlers” by the Upper Creeks. 141 The division between
Upper and Lower Creeks deepened, but the Upper Creeks gradually began to gain more
power in the 1820s.
In 1824, the National Council began deliberations on formal national policy. 142
Encouraged by Cherokee allies, the Council declared that they would not yield any additional land to the American government. 143 In addition, they explicitly rejected the notion
of individual title to land, emphasizing the importance of communal land holdings. 144
Significantly, the Mvskoke leaders also committed laws and policies to writing, “in order
that our chiefs may keep in mind what laws have been passed.” 145 Soon, the first official
written Mvskoke laws were hand-written in broken English by William McIntosh’s son,
Chilly McIntosh. 146
The state of Georgia’s desire for Creek lands was relentless, despite the Creek policy statement of 1824. 147 Georgia leaders enlisted the support of the U.S. Secretary of
War in their efforts to acquire more Creek land. 148 Most Mvskoke leaders refused to ne136. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 49–51; see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 235–39.
137. See generally ETHRIDGE, supra note 58.
138. The final battle in 1814, known as the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, resulted in the loss of over 3,000
Mvskoke people (about 15 percent of the population). GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 53.
139. Treaty of Fort Jackson, Aug. 8, 1814, 7 Stat. 120 (1814).
140. Black chattel slavery was introduced to Mvskoke people in the mid eighteenth century by traders in
South Carolina and Georgia. Kathryn E. Braund, The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery, 57 J. S. HIST. 601
(1991).
141. INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
142. DEBO, supra note 55, at 88.
143. Id. (citing Niles’ Weekly Register, XXVIII, 225 (1824)); PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85 (explaining that by 1824 “Georgia’s demands for the acquisition of all Creek land in the state became nearly hysterical.”); See also Savage, supra note 125.
144. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 59.
145. DEBO, supra note 55, at 88.
146. See Antonio J. Waring, Introduction, in LAWS OF THE CREEK NATION (Antonio J. Waring ed., 1960).
147. In efforts to appropriate Creek lands, local non-Native officials began a public relations campaign
which maligned the Mvskoke government. Governor Wright of Georgia declared that the Creeks “have no
form of government or any coercive power among them.” CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 12. Other derogatory
descriptions of early Creek government contain the same stereotypes of weak and ineffectual leadership. The
outside observers, with a Eurocentric monarchy as their standard of governance, perceived a leader who acted
in a specifically counselor or mediation capacity as being without power. Southern state courts also ruled in
favor of removal. See, e.g., TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN
JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002).
148. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85.
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gotiate any additional land cessions, but the Georgia representatives approached William
McIntosh and offered him a bribe in return for signing the treaty. 149 McIntosh accepted
the bribe on February 12, 1825, and signed the Treaty of Indian Springs, ceding all Creek
lands in Alabama and Georgia in return for lands in Indian Territory. 150 The Creek leaders deemed this treason, and McIntosh was executed on April 30, 1825. 151 Followers of
McIntosh who intended to abide by the terms of the 1825 treaty left for Indian Territory
almost immediately. 152 The majority of the Mvskoke people, however, remained on their
ancestral lands.
The federal government, however, still expected all Mvskoke people to abide by
the 1825 treaty regardless of the taint of confirmed bribery and deceit. In an effort to secure better terms, several chiefs traveled to Washington, D.C. to sign a superseding treaty in 1832. 153 These leaders were under considerable pressure to sign another removal
treaty, as Georgia and Alabama state officials were increasingly hostile to the continued
presence of Indians. 154 Under the terms of the 1832 treaty, the Mvskoke leaders agreed to
sell all remaining lands in Alabama and move west to Indian Territory. 155 The federal
government promised to pay for removal and support in Indian Territory, but did not
keep most of those promises. Significantly, the Removal Treaty did promise that the
Mvskoke people would have the right to “perpetual self-government” in their new
lands. 156
PART III: TRAGEDY: 1832-1867
A. Nene ‘Stemerketv–“The Road of Suffering”
The history of the Mvskoke Nene ‘Stemerketv (Road of Suffering) is critical to appreciating the conditions under which Mvskoke people re-constituted their governments
in Indian Territory in the 1830s. 157 The forced removal of tribal nations from the south149. William McIntosh was to personally receive $25,000 to compensate him for ceded lands. Savage, supra
note 125, at 39.
150. Treaty with the Creeks, Feb. 12, 1825, 7 Stat. 237; see also PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85. The
treaty was also signed by several other men who did not have the legal authority to sign such a treaty. Savage,
supra note 125, at 39. The United States Senate ratified the treaty on March 7, 1825, despite Creek protests that
McIntosh did not have the legal authority to sign the treaty. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 66, at 85–86.
151. Governor Troup and the Georgia legislature threatened to invade the Creek Nation in response to McIntosh’s execution. President John Quincy Adams was instrumental in convincing Georgia not to attack the Creek
Nation. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 86. Tensions remained high with Alabama, as well. In 1832, the
state of Alabama passed a law which prohibited the functioning of the Creek national government. Id.
152. “The first of the more than 700 Indians, Lower Creeks led by Roley McIntosh, reached Fort Gibson in
Indian Territory in February, 1828, and by the following November the migration was complete.” Savage, supra note 125, at 40.
153. Treaty with the Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366; Savage, supra note 125, at 39. The Indian Removal
Act had been introduced in Congress in 1829 and signed into law by President Andrew Jackson in 1830. 25
U.S.C. § 72 (2012).
154. Removal of tribal people became a formal policy of most state governments throughout the south and
particularly in Georgia, whose leaders wanted more land for a plantation-based economy. GARRISON, supra
note 147, at 7. Eventually their policy was endorsed by federally elected officials.
155. Under the terms of the treaty, the federal government promised to pay for the costs of removal and one
year of support in Indian Territory. However, another clause allowed some Creek citizens to remain in Alabama if they accepted an allotment in Alabama. Savage, supra note 125, at 41.
156. Treaty with the Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366.
157. We are grateful to Rosemary McCombs Maxey for explaining the Mvskoke terminology for the forced
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eastern United States has been described as a death march which “pales in comparison”
to the “Bataan Death March.” 158 The physical devastation has been well-documented;
less so, the cultural and political extermination that the removal initiated. The series of
events is known—inadequately—as “The Trail of Tears,” particularly the events that befell the neighboring Cherokee Nation. In all, there were dozens of trails, and while there
were certainly tears, forced removal caused far more harm than mere sadness.
The removal, which was organized and executed by the U.S. military, resulted in
major disruption to the Mvskoke government. Approximately 23,000 Mvskoke people
were forced to travel to Indian Territory by foot and riverboats. Several thousand died
along the way. 159 Re-establishing Creek government in Indian Territory was complicated
by many factors, not the least of which were the emotional, spiritual, and physical fatigue
of dispossession and forced relocation. 160 Moreover, Upper and Lower Creeks antipathies persisted during and after removal. 161 Lower Creeks arrived in Indian Territory
several years before the Upper Creeks and re-established their etvlwv system, clustered
around the Arkansas river valley. They became known as Arkansas Creeks. 162 In 1836,
the Upper Creeks arrived (largely involuntarily) in Indian Territory and began to try to
piece together their society, settling in the Canadian river valley about fifty miles away
from the Lower Creeks. They became known as Canadian Creeks. The Upper Creeks and

relocation that took place during this time period.
158. David E. Stannard, Genocide in The Americas: Columbus’s Legacy, THE NATION 430 (1992); see also
Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1183
(2000); Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (2008); Nathan Goetting, The Marshall Trilogy and the Constitutional Dehumanization of American Indians, 65 GUILD
PRAC. 207 (2008).
159. Some sources suggest that up to 40 percent of Mvskoke people died on the forced journey. See, e.g.,
TANIS C. THORNE, THE WORLD’S RICHEST INDIAN: THE SCANDAL OVER JACKSON BARNETT’S OIL FORTUNE
21 (2005) (asserting that 33-45 percent of Creek people died from disease, exposure, natural disasters, and starvation); see also ALEXANDER POSEY, CHINNUBBIE AND THE OWL 3 (2005). While many Mvskoke people stood
their ground for several years, Jackson ordered the army to force remaining Mvskoke people to leave Alabama
in 1836. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 71-72, 81-83. William Savage contemplated:
Brigadier General Winfield Scott . . . with several thousand regular troops and volunteers, set out for Creek territory early in 1836. Scott’s army entrapped more than 14,500
Creeks. Approximately 2,500 were classified as hostiles, put in chains and marched
overland to Indian Territory. The long march lasted through the winter of 1836-1837,
and hundreds died along the way. The survivors reached Fort Gibson in the spring of
1837, but their arrival did not mark the end of hardship. Once in the territory, some
3,500 Creeks died of exposure or disease.
Savage, supra note 125, at 39. Atwood suggests that 15,000 Mvskoke members did not survive. Eleanor Patricia Atwood, The Crazy Snake Rebellions: A Study in the Breakdown of Tribal Government, 15 VASSAR J. OF
UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES 44, 45 (1942).
160. Claudio Saunt, Telling Stories: The Political Uses of Myth and History in the Cherokee and Creek Nations, 93 J. OF AM. HIST. 673, 687 (2006). Perdue and Green note, “[v]irtually every family in all tribes had lost
kin.” PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 101.
161. See Christopher D. Haveman, The Removal of the Creek Indians from the Southeast, 1825-1838 (Aug.
10, 2009) (dissertation, Auburn University), available at http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/handle/10415/2184; see also
John Bartlett Meserve, Chief Pleasant Porter, 9 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 318 (1931). Indeed, many of the Lower
Creeks had emigrated voluntarily and selected the best lands in Indian Territory for their settlements. When the
Upper Creeks were forced to move by the military, they arrived to find the best lands already occupied. GREEN,
THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 44-47.
162. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 86. We know that the Lower Creeks (now known as Arkansas
Creeks) were functioning as a unified government, because its Chief petitioned the United States to remove
missionaries in 1836. W. Edwin Derrick, Coweta Mission: Struggle for the Mind and Soul of the Creek Indians,
RED RIVER VALLEY HIST. REV. 4 (Winter 1979).
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Lower Creeks operated independently for several years. 163 Because of the history of distrust and betrayal related to the bribery scandal and false treaty promises made by the
U.S. government, the division between the two groups became even more volatile. 164
B. Indian Territory
During the remainder of nineteenth century, Mvskoke national experience was
fraught with internal disputes, sometimes culminating in armed conflict. 165 Mvskoke
people engaged in at least three civil wars, between members favoring more progressive
ways and those wanting to retain traditional culture and decentralized, etvlwv governments. 166 It was only through perseverance that the Mvskoke people held on to political
sovereignty. Mvskoke people managed to maintain their political identity, and yet adapt
to changing circumstances that allowed Mvskoke self-governance to continue in spite of
the profound trauma of removal. However, the split among the Creek people was profound, implicating existential questions about national identity and cultural assimilation. 167
Efforts to reunite a confederated government began in earnest within five years after removal, which was followed by the proposal of a written constitution. The Arkansas
and Canadian Creeks formed a General Council via “pact” in 1840. 168 The Council established a place for meetings on a hill about midway between the Arkansas and Canadian settlements, called Wekiwa Hulwe. 169 The General Council met annually in a specially constructed council house to deliberate on national matters.
Chiefs, henehas [spiritual leaders], warriors, and medicine men, etc., still discharged their official duties according to the complicated system of precedents observed
by each individual town. In their relations with the central government, they were loosely
classified as (1) chiefs and (2) “lawmakers” or “councilors”. Each town had a chief, one
or two second chiefs, and from four to forty-five lawmakers. 170 The chiefs and one or
two of the lawmakers represented the town in council. 171
The Council structure reflected an intentionally divided government, with a Principal Chief for the Arkansas Creeks and a Principal Chief for the Canadian Creeks, each
chosen by the General Council. 172 Most of the focus of the Council was on external rela163. Savage, supra note 125, at 42.
164. Id. at 41; see FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 41–42 (explaining that “[f]ederal removal of Indian tribes to
the west created horrific splits in tribal leadership systems”); see generally Gibson, supra note 71 (discussing
how historic divisions were preserved); Moore, supra note 78.
165. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 74, n.57 (1994) (noting that “no tribe fought internal wars
as frequently as the Creeks did after contact with whites”).
166. See DONALD L. FIXICO, THE INVASION OF INDIAN COUNTRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AMERICAN
CAPITALISM AND TRIBAL NATURAL RESOURCES 5 (1998); see also PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 102;
Robbins, supra note 104.
167. Littlefield explains that “as the traditional red/white town division declined, it was replaced by one
based on ethnic distinctions, though at times indistinctly defined.” DANIEL F. LITTLEFIELD, ALEX POSEY:
CREEK POET, JOURNALIST, & HUMORIST 15 (1992).
168. GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 55; see also PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 102.
169. DEBO, supra note 55, at 124.
170. Id. at 123.
171. Id.
172. HENRY R. SCHOOLCRAFT, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION RESPECTING THE HISTORY,
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tions, especially as it pertained to other neighboring tribal nations in Indian country.
However, this new Council also codified criminal laws into a national uniform
code during this era. 173 Some of this national legislation was designed to enforce social
norms and created uniform Mvskoke cultural expectations. 174 For example, an 1845 national law instituted a fine for failing to attend annual etvlwv ceremonies. 175 In 1855, the
Council established a national treasury which took control of most of the treaty annuities
that had been distributed by mekkos of the various etvlwv governments. 176 The Council
created its own supremacy doctrine, declaring that an individual etvlwv was forbidden to
suspend a law enacted by the Council. 177
In addition, the General Council took over “main judicial functions.” 178 The Council set itself up as an appellate court, although most of the disputes were still resolved at
the etvlwv level. The appellate process was separate from the legislative function. Debo
explained, “[t]he creation of a separate ‘judicating commity’ illustrates a tendency the
Council had shown since earliest times to divide according to the rank of its members
into specialized functions.” 179 The Council also dealt with matters of foreign policy, in
particular, concerns about neighboring tribes. 180 Meanwhile, American education continued to impress upon young Creeks the values of a centralized government. 181 During this
time period, the centralized government began to exercise unprecedented control over
the etvlwv governments. 182
In 1859, the Arkansas Creek leaders actually proposed a written constitution that
ignored the etvlwv governments as constituents, created a formal national court system,
and required popular elections for national leadership positions. 183 That constitution was
never ratified. The Canadian Creeks (more traditional by nature) rejected the proposal
CONDITION, AND PROSPECTS OF THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES COLLECTED AND PREPARED
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS PER ACT OF CONGRESS 265-77 (1851).
173. GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 56. No written copies survive.
174. HARRING, supra note 165, at 76 (explaining that early Creek laws were “simple codifications of wellunderstood traditional laws”).
175. DEBO, supra note 55, at 126. The involvement of the national council in local, ceremonial matters was
largely unprecedented. Traditionally, this kind of infraction would have been dealt with at the etvlwv level. Id.
at 20–23.
176. Id. at 126.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 127.
179. Id. at 128.
180. Debo describes an 1842 event in which the Creeks met with Osage tribal leaders regarding horse stealing raids. The Osage leaders returned some stolen horses and promised to put an end to the raids. DEBO, supra
note 55, at 134.
181. See generally Saunt, supra note 160.
182. Mvskoke people had adopted a fairly extensive criminal code by 1861. DEBO, supra note 55, at 125. In
addition, civil laws were enacted to deal with increasingly complex legal disputes including horse sales, stray
livestock, and crop damage. Id. Probate matters continued to be governed largely by traditional substantive
law—for example, spouses did not inherit property, only children.
183. Id. at 124–25; Hargrett, supra note 103, at 78; Robbins, supra note 104. Several scholars reference an
1860 Constitution, although it is not clear that there were two separate documents. M. THOMAS BAILEY,
RECONSTRUCTION IN INDIAN TERRITORY: A STORY OF AVARICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND OPPORTUNISM 14
(1972); Hargrett, supra note 103, at 78; Morton, supra note 63; Opler, supra note 62, at 165. No written version of an 1859 or 1860 constitution survives, but Debo suggests that five officials were identified—a principal
and second chief from both the Arkansas and Canadian groups, as well as a single national speaker. They
would hold office for four years. The chiefs were to be elected by popular vote and the speaker was to be appointed by the chiefs. DEBO, supra note 55, at 124.
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because it did not provide for a role for the etvlwv governments. 184 A fundamental dispute about the future of the Creek Confederacy deepened, and it soon became entangled
with the larger war beginning in the eastern United States.
C. United States Civil War
Mvskoke constitutional development stalled when all tribal nations in Indian Territory were swept up in the crisis of the U.S. Civil War. 185 United States troops withdrew
in 1861, and confederate officials quickly moved in to formally occupy Indian Territory. 186 Many Arkansas Creek leaders entered into treaties with the Confederacy, but
Mvskoke people were not unified. 187 The factionalism of the Arkansas and Canadian
Creeks roughly mirrored the North and South factions of the United States, although
clearly the differences preceded and transcended the conflict between the Union and
Confederate states. 188 More assimilated Mvskoke people tended to align with the Confederacy, although a significant number of slave owners also sided with the Union.
The tension between the Loyal and Southern Creeks was as volatile and deadly as
that between the Union and the Confederacy. 189 Powerful and influential Mvskoke leader
Opothleyahola 190 advocated maintaining neutrality, but he was outnumbered by other
leaders who wished to align with the Confederacy. 191 Opothleyahola’s people, known as
the “Loyal Creeks,” eventually fled to Kansas seeking Union troop protection. 192 The
“Southern Creeks,” who signed a Confederate treaty, maintained their form of government throughout the war. 193 The Southern Creeks even sent a delegate to the Confederate
Congress. 194
Meanwhile, Congress passed the Indian Appropriation Act of July 5, 1862, which
authorized the President to unilaterally abrogate treaties with tribes who had rebelled
184. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 102.
185. See Morton, supra note 63.
186. Atwood, supra note 159, at 46.
187. HARRING, supra note 165, at 76–77; see also Donald A. Wise, The Founding of Tulsa, 33 TULSA
ANNALS 17 (1997).
188. Green notes that “scholars have wrongly surmised that the Civil War division was a simple continuation
of an earlier conflict. . . . In reality, Creek politics was a complicated system of shifting alignments just like that
of the United States.” GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 96; see also John Bartlett Meserve, Chief Samuel
Checote, with Sketches of Chiefs Locher Harjo and Ward Coachman, 16 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 401, 403 (noting
that “the long enduring cleavage created by the tribal division into the Upper and Lower Creeks, was augmented by the line up of its members during the Civil War”).
189. At one point, pro-Confederate Creeks put a bounty on the heads of the pro-Union Creeks. THORNE, supra note 159, at 23.
190. Also spelled Opothle Yahola. This is the same Upper Creek leader who resisted removal to Indian Territory. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 62.
191. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 90; PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 105.
192. The tragic story of Opothleyahola and his followers is chronicled in LELA J. MCBRIDE,
OPOTHLEYAHOLO AND THE LOYAL MUSKOGEE: THEIR FLIGHT TO KANSAS IN THE CIVIL WAR (2000). On their
way to Kansas, the group was attacked on three separate occasions by Confederate Cherokee troops. The few
survivors made it to safety in Kansas in the middle of winter. The Union troops were not present to protect
them as had been promised. Several hundred loyal Mvskoke people froze or starved to death in southern Kansas in 1862. See also PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 105–06.
193. Ohland Morton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 9 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 1, 22-23 (1931). The treaty
signed by the Confederate Creeks is discussed in the Preamble of Treaty With the Creeks, June 14, 1866, 14
Stat. 785 (1866) (“[T]he Creeks made a treaty with the so-called Confederate States, on the tenth of July, one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, whereby they ignored their allegiance to the United States”).
194. DEBO, supra note 55, at 158.
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against the United States. 195 After extended post-war negotiation, Mvskoke leaders
signed a new treaty with the United States on June 14, 1866. 196 The treaty did not distinguish between Loyal and Confederate Creeks, and ultimately treated the entire tribe as
rebels. 197 The treaty required the Creeks to cede half of their land and to allow a railroad
through their remaining territory. 198 The treaty also approved the development of U.S.
federal courts in Indian Territory, a provision which would later play a significant role in
the near destruction of the Creek government. 199 However, the United States reaffirmed
some previous treaty obligations, including the promise that the United States “shall not
in any manner interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, rights, laws, privileges, and customs.” 200 In short, the United States promised to respect the constitutional
government of the Mvskoke people.
The cessions made in the 1866 treaty were the subject of bitter controversy among
the Mvskoke people. As such, the political and cultural divisions between the Loyal
Creeks and the Southern Creeks continued for many years. 201 Meanwhile, the local governance structure continued to operate separately. Etvlwv mekkos and lawmakers met annually to regulate internal affairs. 202
PART IV: REBUILDING: 1867-1906
The Southern and Loyal Creeks began to work together to unify the nation, culminating in a February 1867 agreement to create a committee including representatives
from both sides. 203 This agreement laid the foundation for a unified national government.
Indicative of the spirit of the times, a well-known Southern Creek leader, Samuel
Checote, expressed his desire:

195. Indian Appropriation Act of 1871 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)).
196. Treaty with the Creeks, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (1866). It took nearly a year for the Loyal and Confederate Creek factions to agree on a treaty. Negotiations began at Fort Smith (Arkansas) shortly after Robert
E. Lee surrendered in 1865. The treaty was signed in Washington in January 1866. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra
note 49, at 92-94.
197. POSEY, supra note 159, at 5.
198. Treaty with the Creeks, art. III, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (“The Creeks hereby cede and convey to the
United States, to be sold to and used as homes for such other civilized Indians as the United States may choose
to settle thereon, the west half of their entire domain.”) (emphasis added). When white settlers began flooding
into Indian Territory, the Creeks argued that this provision of the treaty had been violated.
199. Treaty with the Creeks, art. X, ¶ 7, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 789; see infra Part VI.B.3 for a discussion of
the destructive role of federal courts.
200. Treaty with the Creeks, art. X, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 788 (1866). In 1878, Chief Coachman explained
the typical Mvskoke perspective of the Treaty of 1866 during his annual address:
We were also guaranteed the right of self Government, and full jurisdiction over all
citisens [sic]—whether native or adopted; and with a solemn agreement; that no state or
Territory should ever pass laws for our government, and that no portion of our Territory
should ever be embraced or included within, or annexed to any Territory or State, nor
should any part ever be erected into a Territory, without the full and free consent of the
legislative authority of our nation.
Letter from Ward Coachman, Principal Chief of the Muskogee Nation, to the House of Kings and House of
Warriors of The Muskogee Nation (Oct. 1878) (on file with the University of Oklahoma Library).
201. Meserve, supra note 188, at 401; W.W. Stuckey, Last Meeting of Creek Council, THE BIXBY BULLETIN
(1907).
202. DEBO, supra note 55, at 164.
203. Id. at 179. See generally GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 94.
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[T]hat the Muscogee people unite and live as one Nation and those
who were North during the late war, were not to be called Northern
peop[le] and those who were South, were not to be Southern people; in
short there was to be no North and no South among the Muscogee
people but peace and friendship. 204
Other actions taken at the February 1867 meeting included a plan to elect a single
principal chief in May and the appropriation of money for a new council house. Before
the May election however, some foundational changes were made by a committee of reformists who sought to institute widespread assimilation through a written constitution.
A. 1867 Constitution
On October 12, 1867, a new constitution and code of laws for the “Muskogee Nation” was unanimously adopted. 205 The 1867 Constitution has since been criticized and
blamed for myriad later problems. The drafting appears to have been entirely controlled
by the Southern Creeks, who generally favored assimilation with American laws. 206 Poor
drafting created some problems, but longstanding disputes between the Loyal Creeks and
Southern Creeks stymied resolution of other tensions. 207 Most problematic, the Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution, “instead of being shaped out of Creek
background or political consciousness.” 208 The Constitution did provide for a bicameral
legislature which honored the role of the etvlwv governments as constituents. 209 White
204. DEBO, supra note 55, at 179. To this day, Republicans are still referred to as “[t]he cold ones” - probably because their origin is in the north. See MARTIN & MCKANE MAULDIN, supra note 2, at 34 (the Mvskoke
word for “Republicans” is este-kvsappv). Rosemary McCombs Maxey provided a helpful interpretation of this
word.
205. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION, Oct. 12, 1867. A detailed description of the
1867 Constitution is also available in BAILEY, supra note 183, at 109-11 (1972).
206. DEBO, supra note 55, at 180. The Southern Creeks had several advantages in this process. Southern
Creeks tended to be wealthier and more inclined to adopt American norms of behavior and law.
207. One commentator noted that the Southern Creeks, “after a somewhat stormy session, framed the constitution under which the affairs of the tribe were administered thereafter.” John Bartlett Meserve, Chief Isparhecher, 10 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 52, 56 (1932). See also Moore, supra note 78, at 177 (explaining that that the
1867 Constitution “was altogether so brief (five pages) and so vague that the Tribal Towns recognized it immediately as a sham.”). The Mvskoke experience is not unique among tribal nations in the United States. Cornell explains that Americans often “introduced governing structures that were in direct conflict with the political traditions of the nations they were supposed to govern.” Stephen Cornell, Remaking the Tools of
Governance: Colonial Legacies, Indigenous Solutions, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 57, 60 (Miriam Jorgenson ed., 2007). But see Meserve, supra note 161, at
318 (“[t]he Creek constitution of 1867 may be said to be the initial gesture by the tribe toward intelligent, responsible government.”).
208. MORRIS E. OPLER, REPORT ON THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF ASPECTS OF CREEK
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT 12 (1937).
209. See generally Robbins, supra note 104. Felix Cohen, an Interior Department employee from 1933 to
1947 who has been referred to as the father of Federal Indian Law, dismissed such bicameral tribal legislatures
as wasteful.
[T]here can be no justification for having two distinct legislative bodies in a single tribe.
The extra expense; the duplication of effort when two independent bodies have to consider the same matters separately; the consequent delay, friction, and inefficiency; the divided responsibility; the temptation of each house to blame the other for what goes wrong
instead of trying to cure the wrong, all these consequences make a two-chambered legislature highly inadvisable for any Indian tribe.
FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 32 (1934). As a result, very few tribal consti-
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outsiders praised the 1867 Constitution as a hallmark of Creek civilization and frequently
characterized opposition to the Constitution in racial terms as by “Full Bloods.” 210 English speakers with American educations had the upper hand in drafting the 1867 Constitution and were sometimes accused of misleading the traditional people about the true
nature of the legal changes. 211 One leader of the more traditional Loyal Creeks,
Oktarharsars Harjo (also known as Sands) stated, “I wanted to make a law and told them
to fix the old Indian law, but they made another, and when we found it out, it was the
same as the white man’s law.” 212
The 1867 Constitution in large part mirrored the language of the U.S. Constitution.
First, the preamble was largely lifted from that of the United States: “In order to form a
more perfect union, establish Justice, and secure to ourselves and our children the blessing of freedom and liberty, We the people of the Muskogee Nation do adopt this constitution.” 213 Second, the Constitution created three separate branches of government. However, the Mvskoke Constitution provided very few enumerated powers. 214 The Executive
Branch was formalized as a branch of government with elected positions. 215 The Principal Chief and Second Chief were to be popularly elected and hold office for four
years. 216 Next, the Mvskoke Constitution vested “law-making” power in a National
Council, a bi-cameral body in which each etvlwv was entitled to one delegate in the
House of Kings and one delegate in the House of Warriors, with an additional delegate in
the House of Warriors for every two hundred people. 217 The members of the council

tutions adopted after 1934 had any kind of bicameral law-making entity. In Cohen’s haste to encourage the
tribes to adopt unicameral legislatures as more efficient, the traditional role of the bicameral approach for many
tribal cultures was overlooked.
210. See, e.g., The Creek Nation: A Settlement of their Troubles Effected—Samuel Checote Declared Chief,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
23,
1871,
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=F10F13FF395515768FDDAA0A94D8415B818BF0D3; see also Creek Nation Advances,
MCINTOSH COUNTY DEMOCRAT 2 (1974).
211. A Constitution based on the U.S. model was an affront to Mvskoke people who maintained traditional
value systems. Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 11, 15 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) (“the values underlying
the U.S. Constitution often are at odds with the values and institutional relations of most Native traditions.”).
212. DEBO, supra note 55, at 182.
213. See CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION (1867).
214. Substantive enumerated powers were codified in statute (e.g., appointment power, Ch. 1., Sec. 5
(1880)). Separation of powers also manifested itself in the architecture for the new nation’s capitol building.
When a new Council House was built in 1878, the building contained three separate chambers for the three
branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial. Brochure, Creek Council House Museum 10 (on
file with the author). The Council House still stands today in downtown Okmulgee, Oklahoma. The structure
was sold to the city of Okmulgee in 1919, and has served as a museum since that time. In 2010, the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation repurchased this historical building for $3.2 million. See Sara Plummer, Tribe Regains Historic
Council
House,
TULSA
WORLD,
Nov.
15,
2010,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/aspx?articleid=20101115_11_A13_CUTLIN80706.
215. See generally CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION (1867).
216. See id. at art. II, § 1. Voting was limited to male citizens over the age of 18. This was a change from
earlier Mvskoke government schemes in which the Principal Chief would be selected by the Kings and Warriors.
217. See id. at art. I. Towns were also mentioned explicitly in the statutory law. For example, towns served
as the polling places for national elections. See id. ch. IX, art. I. Recall that the early “Grand Council” specified
that Warriors would come from red clans and Kings would come from white clans. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text. No specification of those roles was made in the text of the constitution. Thus it appears, at
least from the text, that a traditional government structure was replaced by an American-style representational
government.

2013]

MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

149

were also elected for four-year terms. 218 Although the Constitution called for these representatives to be elected by popular vote, the intent was that each etvlwv government
would send its mekko to serve in the House of Kings. The House of Warriors was more
of a typical representative government, with larger etvlwv governments being allowed
more seats in the legislature than smaller etvlwv governments. 219 All laws passed by the
both houses of the Council were to be approved by the Principal Chief. 220 The Principal
Chief had veto power which could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Council. 221
The new structure was implemented swiftly. The first election governed by the
new Constitution was held in November, less than one month after the Constitution was
approved and most traditional people, largely made up of Loyal Creeks, were unable to
attend and vote. 222 The pro-assimilation movement, largely made up of Southern Creeks,
was thus able to take political control of the new Nation. Samuel Checote, a primary architect of the constitution, became the first Principal Chief. In January 1868, the new
court system was initiated in several districts. 223 Later that year, a Council House was
completed and the new seat of the nation was called Okmulgee. 224 The first task of this
legislative body was to work on criminal laws, civil and criminal procedure rules, the
imposition of taxes on cattle drives through tribal lands, and the process for approving
settlement by non-Natives. 225 The final part of implementing the 1867 Constitution was
the creation of the Supreme Court, which was also established without any participation
from a majority of the Loyal Creek people. 226
The Sands faction continued to work toward repealing the constitution and returning to the old laws:
[t]he Indians of the Anti-Government element looked upon the adoption of the white man’s institutions with disfavor. They seemed to de-

218. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1120 (D.C. 1976).
219. The creation of new towns was prohibited by statutory law. CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE
NATION (1867) ch. 12. art. VIII.
220. Id. art. II, § 4.
221. Id.
222. Opler, supra note 62, at 166-70.
223. DEBO, supra note 55, at 184-85. Article III of the 1867 Constitution established the “high court” (a
phrase that quickly fell into disuse in favor of “Supreme Court”). Section 1 provided the “supreme law-defining
power in this nation shall be lodged in a high court.” CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION (1867) art.
III, § 1. However, Section 2 limits the power of the high court to “all cases where the issue is for more than one
hundred dollars ($100).” Id. § 2. The five judges of the Supreme Court were chosen by the National Council at
its annual session. The judges had to be at least twenty-five years old and a “competent recognized citizen of
the Muskogee [Creek] Nation.” Id. Article IV established six local judicial districts, each to be “furnished with
a judge, a prosecuting attorney, and a company of light horsemen [law enforcement].” Id. art. IV, § 1. The constitution set forth the process for choosing judges, the power to summon juries, and other logistical matters. See
id. art. IV. However, there was no codified appellate procedure. Indeed, a plain reading of the text would suggest that the Article IV trial courts had far more authority and power than the Article III high court. However, it
appears that very few final decisions from these Article IV trial courts were appealed to the Supreme Court.
224. Okmulgee remains the capital of the Creek Nation today.
225. DEBO, supra note 55, at 188. The Council adopted both domestic and foreign laws. In addition to
providing appropriations for various government activities, such as education, the Council entered into international compacts agreements with other tribes. See, e.g., Ohland Morton, Reconstruction in the Creek Nation, 9
CHRONS. OF OKLA 171, 173 (1931).
226. DEBO, supra note 55, at 185. For example, one of the Loyal Creeks, Cotchoche, was offered a seat on
the Supreme Court but declined to serve. Id.
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sire the conditions of society and government that existed prior to the
removal of the Creeks to Indian Territory, and this element followed
those who would promise government of that nature. 227
After an armed standoff, the two factions came together to resolve their differences
under the guidance of the local Indian agent. In the end, most of the traditional people
honored their promise to work within the auspices of the written Constitution of 1867. 228
However, the truce was only temporary. The development of the 1867 Constitution
and the subsequent schism was the first instance of what would become a recurring pattern over the next 150 years. Some elements of Mvskoke society have desired more cultural and political assimilation, while other elements of Mvskoke society retain their precolonial ways, operating a traditional etvlwv government in the shadows. 229 This shadow
government became a key factor in the 1979 federal decision, upholding the 1867 Constitution. It is ironic that the shadow government of the traditional Creek would ultimately save the constitution written by the assimilationist Creeks. However, a “prolonged
constitutional struggle” ensued. 230 The Muscogee Supreme Court weighed in on several
of these disputes.
B.

Muscogee Supreme Court

This section examines three nineteenth century Muscogee Supreme Court opinions
which helped to shape the constitutional structure of the nation. 231 As noted earlier, the
1867 Constitution provided very few enumerated powers for the court systems. Two different articles established two separate court systems, and no appellate structure was articulated. 232
In addition to having no clear appellate authority, there was also no textual basis
for judicial review, and thus no clear basis for overturning actions of the legislative
and/or executive branches. The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this issue in 1803 when it

227. BAILEY, supra note 183, at 118.
228. Green explains, “[a]fter every great civil conflict, it was characteristic of [Mvskoke] political maturity
to reach some sort of agreement, to forgive one another and, to reunite.” GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra
note 65, at 76.
229. Sidney Harring explains, “[t]here can be no question that a traditional law, invisible to whites, functioned alongside the formal legal institutions of the Indian nations, a set of legal institutions adopted by the
elected National Councils and based on American law.” Sidney L. Harring, Crazy Snake and the Creek Struggle for Sovereignty: The Native American Legal Culture and American Law, 34 AM. J. OF LEGAL HISTORY
365, 370 (1990).
230. See, e.g., 1870 REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: CREEK AGENCY, INDIAN TERRITORY, at 2.
There still exists some little trouble between the legal government and the Sands faction,
which is being augmented by Sands visiting Washington and returning with long stories
and promises, which are told as coining [sic] from the Government, and which create dissension and strife, resulting frequently in open rebellion against the constitutional authorities.
231. The contemporary (post-1979) Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court sometimes cites to these opinions, even though they are cases interpreting the 1867 Constitution, which is no longer the governing document. See, e.g., Ellis v. Nat’l Council, 9 Okla. Trib. 190 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2006) (citing Muscogee Nation v. Tiger, 1 Mvs. L. Rep. 8 (1885)).
232. In fact, there was separate attorney admission for the district courts and the supreme courts. CONST.
AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION chapter XII, art. VII.
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decided Marbury v. Madison. 233 However, that decision pre-dated the Creek Constitution
and was not binding precedent, as it emanated from a foreign government. 234 Thus, the
new Supreme Court encountered many of the same issues that arose in the early years of
the United States, when inter-branch disputes threatened the constitutional structure. The
major role of the Supreme Court in these disputes was to answer inquiries from the Principal Chief and/or the National Council on the constitutionality of existing or proposed
legislation. 235 Court records do not reveal any type of formal constitutional litigation—
thus the constitutional jurisprudence from this time period emerges in the form of advisory opinions. 236
These three opinions analyzed below suggest that the Mvskoke judiciary, like the
legislative and executive branches, was officially proceeding as an assimilated American-style government. 237 While it is possible that the justices were considering traditional
Mvskoke government principles, none of the opinions mentions the role of the etvwlv
governments, clans, or division of power between the red and white polities. The justices
of the Supreme Court were clearly influenced by the dominant Anglo-American legal
culture. 238 While the justices themselves did not have law degrees from American law
schools, they probably interacted with Anglo-American lawyers and government agents
frequently.
During the time period in which these decisions were written, the etvwlv governments continued to be the “most important unit of collective life” despite the fact that its
power was not included in the written constitution and the Supreme Court never mentioned them in its constitutional law decisions from this era. 239 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s earliest opinions show a marked deviation between how Creek people traditionally governed themselves and how the new, assimilated Supreme Court was applying the
American-style constitution. Arguably, the court sought to bolster its legitimacy of the

233. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803).
234. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
235. In 1878, the Supreme Court ruled that it would not issue advisory opinions based on the petition of individuals, but only upon referral from the executive or legislative branch. Smith v. Adams, 7 Mvs. L. Rep. 270
(Sup. Ct. of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation 1878).
236. While the United States Supreme Court does not issue so-called “advisory opinions” (see, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792)), the nineteenth century Muscogee Supreme Court did offer constitutional opinions on matters that were not in active, adversarial litigation.
237. Speeches given by Mvskoke (Creek) leaders in the same time period also reflect an understanding that
the Mvskoke people were governed by an American-style three-branch government. For example, in 1883,
Chief Perryman explained the limited role of the executive branch in his inaugural address, using language similar to that used to espouse the genius of the American Constitution:
If the genius of the Muskogee [Creek] government contemplated intrusting [sic] the care
of their interests of the people to the Chief alone; if it were left to him alone to furnish
the wisdom necessary to plan and develop the ways and means to secure the greatest
good to the greatest number of [Creek] citizens, my case might indeed seem discouraging, but this is not so, and it is a matter for congratulation that we are all favored with a
government republican in form, where no monarch rules, but where government is the
immediate outgrowth of the people themselves.
J.M. Perryman, Principal Chief of Muskogee Nation, Inaugural Message to the National Council (Dec. 5,
1883).
238. L.C. Perryman, Principal Chief of Muskogee Nation, Annual Message to National Council (Oct. 11,
1888) (“[w]e cannot make jurists of our judges in one nor in five years”).
239. DEBO, supra note 55, at 291.
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court in the eyes of American lawyers and outside forces. 240 This poses the question of
whether the court sacrificed its internal legitimacy and relevance of the court itself, or
whether this was part of a more concerted effort to shield the internal politics of the
Creek nation from outside interference. In these cases, the court demonstrated its independence from powerful interest groups within the tribe. 241 The court found in favor of
the assimilationist interests and against the more traditional factions within the tribe. 242
And in the preferred warrant case, the court demonstrated its independence from the
members of the tribal council who were arguably the wealthy power-brokers of that
era. 243
1. Permit cases (1875 and 1884)
The legislation which triggered the development of a Mvskoke judicial review
principle relates to a set of facts implicating both cultural and legal assimilation. In handwritten advisory opinions, the Supreme Court twice declared acts of Council unconstitutional during the late nineteenth century. These opinions (one from 1875 and one from
1884) are the earliest examples of written Mvskoke constitutional jurisprudence. 244
The laws struck down by the Supreme Court were bans on most forms of white
settlement and employment. 245 Following the Civil War, illegal white settlers began
flooding into Indian Territory, causing considerable anxiety for all tribal governments. 246
It was difficult for tribal nations to control the behavior and settlement of squatters—
unscrupulous characters who sought to profit from perceived legal ambiguity in the settlement of tribal lands. 247 Legislative efforts to protect Creek land from illegal settlement
began in the first Council session, and remained a high priority in every recorded session
of the National Council until 1906. 248 The Council initially established a permit system
to ensure that any white settlers or laborers were of noble character and had local references. 249 It appears that this permit system did not address the crisis of illegal settle-

240. See generally, HARRING, supra note 165, at 82, 100-05 (explaining that the constitutional legal order
was an attempt to strike “accommodation with the United States, which respected only legal institutions resembling its own”).
241. See generally id.
242. Id.
243. See W.F. McIntosh, Preferred Warrants Unlawful, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX, June 12, 1895.
244. DEBO supra note 55, at 215-16. Debo describes the opinion as “labored” and “forced” and suggests that
the Supreme Court was simply adopting the norms and values of the United States. Id.
245. See infra notes 247-77 and accompanying text.
246. Atwood, supra note 159, at 46. The Creek Council passed at least 20 statutes over a 30 year period to
try to deal with illegal actions of white settlers. In 1937, a Mvskoke elder explained, "[t]here were too many
white people coming into the Indian Territory to even think that the Indians could keep on with the tribal laws."
Interview with Daniel Starr, in Henryetta, Okla. (Oct. 18, 1937).
247. Atwood, supra note 159, at 46 (“[i]n twenty years, the white element composed two thirds of the population”); see also BAILEY, supra note 183, at 124.
248. HARRING, supra note 165, at 91 (describing these measures as “sound and sensible measures promoted
by traditional Creeks.”).
249. CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION ch. 7, Art. 4, § 1 (1880). Even spouses and parents of
Creek citizens were required to obtain a government permit to remain with their families. Id. at art. III, §§ 1-2
(statute indicates spouses and parents of Muskogee citizens would have a right to live in the nation, “provided
that such person shall satisfy the Principal Chief as to their good character and honest intentions, and provided
that the Principal Chief shall grant to such person permit to reside in the Nation during good behavior”).
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ment. 250 Because of continuous problems in controlling white men and a general distrust
of the actions of white speculators and laborers, there was considerable pressure to completely outlaw all white labor. 251 Thus, in 1875, the Council passed an act which repealed
the permit system, and criminalized the employment of any “United States citizen” within Creek territory. 252
However, many wealthier Mvskoke ranchers sought to re-establish plantation-style
agriculture and needed white laborers. 253 These plaintiffs usually complained to the executive branch that the acts of Council violated the 1867 Constitution. 254 This tension
resulted in an extended debate about legislative authority, which lasted nearly nine (9)
years. 255 The debate began almost immediately. When Lochar Harjo was elected Principal Chief just a few months after the permit system was abolished (thus banning employment of U.S. citizens), he advocated for a reinstatement of the permit system. 256 His
inaugural address included strong language that the permit system should be reestablished so that United States citizens could once again be employed in the nation. 257
When the Council failed to act on Harjo’s proposal, he asked the Muscogee Supreme
Court to review the constitutionality of the ban on white laborers. 258
The 1875 opinion is basically a line-by-line interpretation of the Muscogee Constitution preamble, which essentially mirrored that of the United States. 259 From a modern
perspective, it is curious that the opinion only reviews language from the preamble, and
does not examine any other section of the constitution. 260 There are at least two ways to
interpret this choice. Perhaps, given the dearth of American-educated lawyers in the
Creek nation, the Supreme Court focused on the concepts found in the more accessible
language of the preamble rather than the legalistic language found in the body of the
1867 Constitution. Another possible reason that the court focused only on the preamble
250. Atwood, supra note 159, at 47 (describing an “era when men had only to pack up their belongings and
move west to find free land waiting for them to cultivate.”).
251. See generally Atwood, supra note 159.
252. CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION ch. VII, art. VI, §§ 1-2. The penalty for violating this
provision was a minimum five of fifty dollars. The law only applied to laborer or a herder. It did not apply to
teachers, mechanics, physicians, or clerks. Id. at ch. VI, art. VI, § 3. This law would not have applied citizens
of other tribes (such as neighboring Cherokee or Choctaw) unless they had become citizens of the United
States.
253. HARRING, supra note 165, at 91-92.
254. Id.
255. On more than one occasion, the Council created an Inspector General position to investigate the status
of all non-Creek citizens living or working on Creek lands. The Inspector General was authorized to banish
those found to be in violation of the law. See, e.g., KENT CARTER, THE DAWES COMMISSION AND THE
ALLOTMENT OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, 1893-1914, at 42 (1999).
256. It doesn’t appear that anyone was arguing that the permit system itself should be abolished—even those
who sought to employ white laborers were in agreement that registration was a necessity.
257. Lochar Harjo, Principal Chief of the Muskogee Nation, Inaugural Address (Dec. 6, 1875).
258. DEBO, supra note 55, at 215.
259. See discussion of preamble, supra note 213 and accompanying text.
260. The preamble of the United States Constitution is typically not regarded as substantive law. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (finding that “no power can be exerted to that end by the United States
unless, apart from the preamble, it be found in some express delegation of power, or in some power to be
properly implied therefrom.”); see also Milton Handler et al., A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117 (1990); Dan Himmelfarb, The
Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 127 (1991). Other countries, however,
do give some weight to the words in the preamble. See, e.g., Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 714 (2010).
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was that the Mvskoke approach to governance had been one that valued principles and
philosophy over technicalities.
The court began by drawing a clear line between the word “justice” and the concept of “right” when it stated:
The first and second clauses of the preamble ‘In order to form a more
perfect union and establish justice,’ asserts and proclaims civilization,
and the privilege of exercising common right—[giving] rights and Justice to whom they are due—They speak of Justice, and what is Justice
but an instrument commanding, extending and protecting that which is
right. 261
Next, the court explained that an individual has a “common right” to say “who
shall cultivate his soil or perform any kind of labor, for a fair compensation.” 262 The
permit legislation, which banned the employment of U.S. citizens, thus was “intruding
upon this right.” 263 Therefore, the court concluded that the legislation violated the second
clause of the preamble (the Establishment of Justice Clause). 264 The court did not stop
with the Establishment of Justice Clause. Next, it considered the third clause: “Securing
to ourselves and our children the blessings of freedom.” 265 The court noted that “Freedom is liberty” and used the same logic it used in analyzing the word “Justice” to conclude that the Mvskoke people have liberty “to perform any duty that is our personal interest and advantage if the performance of such duty does not interfere with the rights
and interests of others.” 266
This 1875 advisory opinion thus established individual liberties and rights as the
centerpiece of the Muscogee Constitution. Concerns about the welfare of the Muscogee
Nation as a collective is not apparent in this interpretive scheme. There is no mention of
possible harm to the Nation as a result of intruders, even though that was what the debate
really centered upon. In the end, the court referred to the rights of individuals to employ
citizens of the United States as “sacred liberty” and found legislation to the contrary to
be “unconstitutional, null [and] void and of no effect . . . .” 267 The advisory opinion did
not permanently halt the controversy over the employment of U.S. citizens. In 1878, a
short civil war erupted within the Creek nation. 268 Known as the “Green Peach” war, it
was prompted by both political differences and frequent criminal acts committed by
white men. 269
A review of acts passed by the Council in the 1880s suggests that illegal settlers
continued to use every mechanism—from brute force to fraud—to acquire land. The

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

DEBO, supra note 55, at 215.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
Meserve, supra note 188, at 407-08.
Id.
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Council passed a multitude of laws to engage with the federal government to banish intruders permanently from Creek lands. As the situation became more desperate, the
Creek Council again began to put new restrictions on white labor. A new permit system
was passed in October 1884, and the Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on the controversial topic once again. 270 However, the court offered the same analysis and ruling
that had been established in the 1875 advisory opinion. The court began by exploring the
genesis of the 1867 Constitution, which stated “[t]he Muscogees found that the rights of
the people of other nations were carefully guarded by a paramount law called a constitution over which neither Chief nor council could pass and, which unlike everything the
Muscogee [Creek] had, was an effective safeguard to the rights of the people.” 271
Next, the court codified the doctrine of checks and balances by concluding that the
constitution guarded against the violation of rights “by a reckless council or the usurpation of an ambitious Chief.” 272 This is the doctrine of judicial review—the court can
strike down unconstitutional laws and policies of the other two branches of government. 273
Finally, the court definitely ruled that taxation and other laws which burdened
Creek employers of U.S. citizens were unconstitutional: “Any law which prohibits our
citizens from employing foreign laborers working and utilizing the natural resources of
our country, or which by taxation or otherwise will so burden and obstruct the use of the
same, must in the [judgment] of this court be [unconstitutional].” 274
These permit opinions were also decided during the same period that the U.S. federal courts were beginning to establish the jurisprudence of substantive due process. 275
While no American cases were cited by the Supreme Court, several significant American
cases were issued in the same decade as the employment permit cases, and those cases
emphasize the importance of keeping a check on government regulations that serve to
limit activity of businesses. 276 Neither of the opinions mentions nor endorses the role of
etvlwv governments in making decisions about employment. It is possible that etvlwv
leaders, who may not have considered the court opinion binding, continued to exercise
decision-making about these kinds of issues at the local level.
2. Preferred Warrant Case (1895)
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in the 1895 Preferred Warrants case is not
particularly complex, the underlying facts demonstrate how the internal struggles of the
270. Act of Oct. 24, 1884. The costs for obtaining a permit were steep. Permits could be granted for a maximum of one year, and the fee was $1.25 per month with a bond of $250.
271. Advisory opinion on the 1884 Permit Law, 7 Mvskoke L. Rep. 320 (Sup. Ct. of the Muskogee Nation
1884).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 611 (2009). The line of economic due process cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century were influenced by “a belief in a laissez-faire, unregulated economy.” Id.
276. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). These cases are important “for articulating that due process was a limit
on the government’s regulatory power, even though in each of these cases the Court ruled in favor of the government.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 275, at 613.

156

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:123

various government branches continued an internal struggle for power. This case implicated Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1867 Constitution, which stated, “[n]o laws taking
effect upon things that occurred before the enactment of the law shall be passed.” 277 The
National Council passed an act in 1893 which gave its members holding warrants a priority, or preference in payments, thus making it more likely that council members would
be paid if total funds were insufficient to make all investors whole. 278 Acting Principal
Chief, Edmond Bullet, referred the matter to the Supreme Court and in June 1895, Chief
Justice W.F. Grayson issued an advisory opinion, which appeared in the “Muscogee
Phoenix” newspaper. 279
This controversy arose during a particularly vulnerable economic time for all
Mvskoke people. Oklahoma became a territory by act of Congress in 1890. 280 The federal Indian policy of allotment was already underway in most of the United States, and the
federal government was attempting to pass similar legislation to impact the Creek, Seminole, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Choctaw Nations. 281 Settlers and speculators understood
that acquiring interest in large amounts of land would prove lucrative in the event of allotment. Wealthy Creek leaders, too, took advantage of this potential opportunity. Some
council members apparently took advantage of this knowledge to pass a preferential law
for themselves, but the executive and judicial branches managed to prevent its enforcement—the executive by querying the court, and the court by declaring the law unconstitutional. 282
The short opinion offers two different lines of analysis: First, the court said that the
legislation was “violative of good faith” without mentioning a particular constitutional
provision; 283 second, the law was found to contravene Article VIII, Section 2, because
the preferred status of council members’ warrants was retroactive. 284 While there is no
specific mention of traditional Mvskoke governing principles, the decision is likely consistent with traditional governance principles of fairness. 285 In the early days of the Creek
Confederacy, etvwlv leaders would likely have been rebuked for an inequitable distribution of resources, especially if they kept wealth for themselves.
This era of constitutional jurisprudence came to an end with the Oklahoma Land
286
Rush. We will never know how the Creek Nation would have developed because the
Supreme Court was abolished by the end of 1906, via federal law. 287 Despite the Creek
Nation’s best efforts to maintain control over its treaty lands, the Nation fell victim to the

277. CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION art. VIII, § 2 This is similar to the ex post facto language in the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 9, cl. 3.
278. W.F. McIntosh, Preferred Warrants Unlawful, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX (June 12, 1895).
279. Id.
280. Okla. Organic Act, May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 81.
281. General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
282. McIntosh, supra, note 278.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. “Indians in Indian Territory were already outnumbered nearly four to one in 1890; ten years later there
were at least six non-Indians for every Indian.” SCOTT L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE AMERICAN
MISADVENTURE OF RACE 103-04 (2000).
287. Indian Territory Protection of the People Act, June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495.
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power of the U.S. government and the economic power of industry. 288 United States expansion, bolstered by the manifest destiny philosophy, left the Creek Nation unable to
sustain its resistance to exclusive authority over its land and people. 289
PART V: SURVIVAL: 1906-1976
As federal power intensified near the end of the nineteenth century, Mvskoke constitutional development stalled yet again. 290 The United States adopted a new policy in
dealing with tribal governments that would see the Creek Nation’s reservation sold out
from underneath them. 291 Allotment and statehood were new tools created by the United
States to seize more land throughout the United States—with the ultimate goal to terminate collective land holdings and governments of tribal nations. 292 However, the 1867
Constitution never fully ceased to operate as a governing document for many Mvskoke
people. This section explains how the 1867 Constitution survived this tumultuous period.
A. Allotment and Statehood
Allotment was a nationwide federal policy designed to extinguish tribal ties and
create individual landowners of Indian people. 293 Unilateral legislation (which often abrogated clear treaty provisions) created various federal commissions, which assigned
small, farm-sized plots of lands to individual Indians. 294 Whatever land remained after
allotment was considered “surplus” and thus opened to non-Indian settlers. 295 The General Allotment Act “had disastrous effects on tribes and reservation life.” 296 The initial
allotment laws specifically exempt the “Five Civilized Tribes” of Indian Territory. 297 But
only a few years passed before political pressure to dissolve the Five Civilized Tribes
began.
Congress set the stage for usurpation of Indian Territory tribal lands and authority
by establishing a new federal court in Indian Territory in 1889. 298 Attorney Susan Work
explains that congressional strategy took two forms: “First, threaten the tribes with abolition of their courts . . . or second, actually abolish the tribal governments, so that tribal
consent to allotment would not be required.” 299
The Muscogee Nation, along with the other southeastern tribal nations in Indian
Territory, actively resisted this policy to prevent the tribal lands from being divided. 300 In

288. See generally MALCOMSON, supra note 286.
289. Id.
290. See FIXICO, supra note 166, at 3.
291. See id.
292. Id.
293. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 42; see also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
294. General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
295. Royster, supra note 293, at 38-39.
296. Kunesh, supra note 16, at 18.
297. General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
298. L. Susan Work, Historical Perspective: The Exercise of Judicial Powers by the Five Tribes 136 (1991)
(on file with author).
299. Id. at 135.
300. Formally opposing allotment.
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1893, the National Council even ordered a new constitution to be drafted. 301 The very
first article of that draft constitution staked a strong constitutional claim against allotment:
The lands of the Muskogee [Creek] Nation shall remain the common
property of the recognized citizens thereof share and share alike; and
the national council may by law prescribe such regulations for the individual use thereof as it shall deem wise and proper; provided always,
that no law or laws shall be enacted individualizing the fee in soil. 302
For unknown reasons, the 1893 “New Constitution” was never ratified. However,
the Creek Council formally opposed the policy of allotment through a series of resolutions. 303 By 1896, the Council again completely banned white labor and non-Creek land
ownership (despite two Supreme Court opinions finding that such laws were unconstitutional.) 304 Clear desperation was evident by 1897, when Council passed a law requiring
the Principal Chief to travel to Washington, D.C., and personally plead with the Secretary of Interior to remove “all intruders . . . at once.” 305
In the meantime, Congress had grown impatient with the stalling actions of the Indian Territory tribes and passed the Curtis Act in 1898. 306 “This law unilaterally abolished the tribal court systems of the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw nations”
and mandated allotment of the tribal lands. 307 To ensure the Tribes could not respond
through legislative action, the Act required all tribal legislation to be approved by the
President of the United States. 308
The Curtis Act offered lip service to tribal self-determination by allowing tribal
governments to “negotiate” agreements for the disposal of tribal lands. 309 However, the
Creek Nation refused to make any agreement, and the implementation of the Curtis Act
began in 1900. 310 In 1901, principal Creek leaders caved under federal pressure and entered into an “agreement” which allowed the federal government to distribute Creek

301. ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION OF 1893 16 (1894)
[hereinafter “ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS”] (reproducing the text of the Nov. 1, 1893 Act that ordered the drafting
of a new Muskogee Constitution).
302. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONST OF 1894 art. I, §. 1.
303. See FIXICO, supra note 166, at 7; see also Meserve, supra note 161.
304. See ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 301, at 64-66 (establishing in the Act of November 6, 1896
that “no permit shall be issued to any non-citizen to reside within the Muskogee Nation for any purpose whatever.”). Non-citizens and those who harbored them were subject to a criminal penalty. The law even made failure to prosecute and banishment an impeachable offense for prosecutors and judges employed by the Nation.
Id.
305. Id. at 76 (Act of Mar. 27, 1897, § 254).
306. The Curtis Act made allotment effective immediately. Tribes were ordered to cease operations as of
March 4, 1906. Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr. & Lonnie E. Underhill, The “Crazy Snake Uprising” of 1909: A Red,
Black, or White Affair?, 20 ARIZ. AND THE W. 307, 308 (1978).
307. Id.; see also Morton, supra note 193.
308. See Littlefield & Underhill, supra note 306, at 307-09.
309. See id. at 308.
310. At this point, the Department of Interior identified forty-four tribal towns and three freedman towns.
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM’N OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES TO THE SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR
(1990), at 22-23.
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land. 311 Other Creek leaders sought to prevent the destruction of tribal sovereignty and
self-determination, but were stymied by federal opposition. 312
Meanwhile, the white population in Oklahoma Territory had been organizing its
statehood petition for years. 313 Creek leaders collaborated with four other tribes in an effort to avoid white-controlled statehood. 314 The Creek Council had formally opposed
statehood as early as 1893, 315 but the last few months of effort involved a comprehensive
attempt to petition for an Indian-controlled state.
The six months’ leeway between October 1905 and March 1906, did not, however, represent a bungled attempt at punctuality on their part. Instead, it was lead-time to
coordinate the actions of four of the five “Civilized Tribes.” 316 Further, “[j]oining together, the Muscogee, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Seminole undertook to form the Native
State of Sequoyah, the name suggested by Chinnubbie Harjo in honor of the great Cherokee syllabicist, Sequoyah.” 317
Congress refused to consider the statehood efforts of the Indian Territory tribal nations. 318 Instead, Oklahoma became the forty-sixth state of the United States in 1907. 319
The combination of the Curtis Act and Oklahoma statehood resulted in a wholesale liquidation of the Creek Nation (at least as recognized by the federal government). 320 The
demise of the “Five Tribes” was eulogized by sentimental journalists with headlines such
as “The Five Civilized Tribes Passing Away”—thus solidifying the dominant society’s
belief that the tribal governments had been dissolved. 321 Indian people who cooperated
with allotment were given 160 acres each, and the intent was for them to assimilate into
mainstream American life, thus eliminating the need for a separate tribal government. 322
311. Agreement of Dawes Comm’n with Muscogee or Creek Tribe of Indians, Mar. 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861.
This statute was likely unconstitutional under Muscogee constitutional law. No provision in the constitution
authorized the tribal leaders to make this kind of decision.
312. The Creek Nation formally opposed Oklahoma statehood via resolution. See The Creek Council Opposes Statehood, MUSKOGEE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 28, 1905.
313. See generally MALCOMSON, supra note 286.
314. Muscogee Chief Pleasant Porter was “chosen permanent chairman of the convention.” Meserve, supra
note 161, at 332.
315. The November 1, 1893 Act was titled “Resolution to be Presented to the United States Commissioners”
and read:
It is the sense of this body that any change to the present status of Indian Territory that
would include the Muskogee Nation within the limits of an organized state of the American Union, would be contrary to the best interests of the citizens of the Nation, and any
proposition of Congress to effect such a change or to include this Nation in any State or
Territory wherein the present Territory of Oklahoma shall be a component part is greatly
to be deprecated and resisted by all proper means.
ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 301, at 12.
316. Mann, supra note 89, at 214.
317. Id.
318. Stacy L. Leeds, Defeat or Mixed Blessing? Tribal Sovereignty and the State of Sequoyah, 43 TULSA L.
REV. 5, 6 (2007). See also MALCOMSON, supra note 286, at 105 (noting that “Sequoyah never really had a
chance.”).
319. Admission of New State: Oklahoma, June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267.
320. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 31 (1968)
(noting that “[t]he final surrender of the tribal institutions came only after prolonged negotiations, with the
threat of force always in the background.”).
321. The Five Civilized Tribes Passing Away, FORT GIBSON DEMOCRAT, 1907.
322. Chief Porter explained: “Though our tribal organization is fading away, we will be transformed as a
potent factor, an element within the body of Christian civilization. The philosophy of history of the future shall
trace many principles of governments and institutions so dear to them, to those found among us.” Meserve,

160

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:123

For at least a decade (one might argue longer), one faction of Mvskoke people
openly defied the federal government and continued to operate as though the Curtis Act
was non-binding. 323 They also refused to accept allotments. 324 This dissenting faction of
traditional Mvskoke people, led by a man named Chitto Harjo (Crazy Snake), attempted
to sustain the constitutional government despite the actions of the United States. 325 Declaring the Curtis Act null and void for Creek people, since it violated the 1832 and 1866
treaties, the Snake faction simply reinstated the national Creek government. 326
The fact that the so-called “Snakes” adopted the same system of governance
demonstrates that the 1832 and 1866 treaties, as well as the 1867 Constitution, continued
to have value and meaning to many Mvskoke people. While popular press from the dominant culture characterized the Snake faction as typical violent Native outlaws, other historical sources suggest that the rebel government actually maintained peace and civility. 327
As for the Snake faction in general, their meetings had been peaceful.
They had never molested or intimidated any person who stopped or
passed by during a council meeting. Chitto Harjo, while telling his
people that their land would be restored to be held in common as in the
old days of the Creek Nation, had nevertheless cautioned them not to
violate the law. 328
Harjo’s actions, of course, were in direct violation of the many agreements and
concessions made by the elected Mvskoke leaders in the early twentieth century and his
government officials were labeled traitors with Chief Porter requesting assistance from
the U.S. military to quash the so-called rebellion. 329 Many leaders of Harjo’s government
were captured in 1901, and pled guilty in federal court to charges of seditious conspiracy. 330 The pleading explains the perspective of Harjo’s group:
We state that as citizens of the Creek nation we have been opposed to
supra note 161, at 330.
323. Douglas A. Hurt, Defining American Homelands: A Creek Nation Example, 1828-1907, at 21 J.
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 19, 34-35 (2003).
324. Id. (claiming that the “Snake” movement maintained etvlwv governments for decades).
325. Atwood, supra note 159, at 48-49. Chitto Harjo had been a member of the House of Kings. He had
fought for the Union during the Civil War. He also worked with an underground group known as the Four
Mothers. Id. See also Kenneth W. McIntosh, Crazy Snake Uprising, OKLA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y’S
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
OKLA.
HISTORY
&
CULTURE,
available
at
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/C/CR004.html.
326. They “elected a principal chief, a second chief, a two-house legislature, and a court. They reenacted the
old laws of the Creek Nation . . . and appointed a police force to enforce them.” Littlefield & Underhill, supra
note 306, at 309.
327. Id. at 319-20.
328. Id. at 320.
329. D.C. Gideon, The Creeks, in HISTORY OF INDIAN TERRITORY 122-23 (1901) (reporting that “Governor
Porter . . . appealed for protection to his people from these deluded Indians who were very threatening toward
the members of the regular Porter council.”).
330. Chief Porter requested assistance from the U.S. military to squash the Crazy Snake uprising. “In response to this appeal, a troop of United States Cavalry arrived from Ft. Reno in January, 1901, and the leaders
of the movement were placed under arrest.” Meserve, supra note 161, at 331.
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the abolition of our courts by any act of congress and to any change in
our tribal form of government, and that in October, 1900, we met together and agreed to form a government of our own, with a full complement of officers, including a judicial system, with a principal chief
and a second chief and a cabinet composed of twelve members. 331
After a sympathetic federal judge lectured the prisoners and then allowed them to
return home (on condition that they abandon their efforts to organize), the Snakes simply
continued to govern themselves. 332 Harring explains “it is clear that the traditional councils simply moved from Hickory Ground and continued their government wherever they
could meet.” 333 Another armed stand-off occurred in 1909, which left the Harjo band
scattered and weakened, although not altogether extinguished. 334 Mvskoke people maintained their traditional town councils, even if they could not operate openly as a government.
Another allied group of people who resisted allotment, statehood, and the destruction of Creek government, was the Four Mothers Society, which included women from
the Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw nations. 335 The Four Mothers Society continued to
educate their community members about the nature of the governments of the tribal nations. Mvskoke literary scholar Craig Womack explains the significance of these efforts:
The Snake and Four Mothers position was that even if no one else on
the face of the earth recognized Creek government, if, in fact, the only
place Creek government was recognized was inside the imaginations of
Creeks who refused the death of their dreams and the meaning of constitutional law in a civilized society, such an imagining was still of utmost importance to their future. 336
The successor groups of people sustained the 1867 Constitutional style government
and local town councils throughout a tumultuous twentieth century during which their
authority was challenged by both internal and external forces.
B. Twentieth Century Struggles
The Mvskoke constitutional system between 1906 and 1976 is not welldocumented. 337 Immediately before Oklahoma statehood, in 1906, Congress passed a

331. Gideon, supra note 329, at 123.
332. Id. at 128-29.
333. Harring, supra note 229, at 378; see also Morton, supra note 225. Chitto Harjo also travelled to Washington, D.C. whenever possible, carrying tattered copies of the 1832 treaty, which he would present to U.S.
Senators and even the President (to no avail). Atwood, supra note 159, at 52.
334. The “Snake Faction” continued to operate until as late as 1930. DEBO, supra note 320, at 295-96; see
also Atwood, supra note 159, at 58.
335. FIXICO, supra note 166, at 11.
336. Craig Womack, Foreword, in TOTKV MOCVSE: NEW FIRE, at xi (Jack B. Martin et al. eds., trans.,
2004).
337. In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals noted that "the Creek National Council per se has not met
in more than sixty years." Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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law which acknowledged the continued existence of the five tribes (including the Creek
Nation) until the allotment and property distribution process was completed. 338 While the
intent of Congress may have been to give Oklahoma authorities a few more years to
complete the paperwork of termination, this law was the critical piece of evidence that
led a federal court, sixty years later, to determine that the federal recognition of the 1867
Creek Constitution had never been extinguished. 339 This was not the official position of
the United States, however, and between 1906 and 1976, the U.S. government dealt with
Mvskoke people as a former tribe without any constitutional authority or any right to
self-determination. 340 After statehood, the Creek Nation, like many tribes, continued to
exist as a nation unto itself, although the United States only recognized the role of Principal Chief, who was appointed by the President of the United States. 341
Some documents exist in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation historical archives and various historical repositories throughout Oklahoma, but there are few formally-published
Creek government documents from this time period. Local newspapers throughout Oklahoma document the story of a Creek Council which continued to function as a confederated government. A group known as the “Creek Convention” began meeting in 1909. 342
The body was comprised of leaders from various etvlwv governments and continued to
operate as a sovereign entity with domestic and foreign powers. 343 Few records document
the activities of this body, but the 1976 federal court decision describes the Convention
as “the successor in function to the National Council.” 344 Local newspapers document
periodic meetings, 345 but also reflect the dominant society’s view that the government
had no legitimate power. The Council met in 1921 and elected a chief, although a regional newspaper declared the title to be “purely honorary”. 346
Etvlwv governments continued to operate independently, but little documentation
is publically available. 347 In 1936, Congress passed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act,
338. Five Civilized Tribes Act, Mar. 2, 1906, 34 Stat. 822; see also Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma’s Tribal
Courts: A Prologue, The First Fifteen Years of the Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 5, 14-15 (1994).
339. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1129 (D.C. 1976).
340. Id.
341. Harring, supra note 229, at 379; see also Morton, supra note 225.
342. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1135. A Convention committee headed by Samuel L. Haynes sent a letter to
Chief Moty Tiger on October 26, 1909, requesting “an immediate session of the National Council.” Letter from
Samuel L. Haynes, Chairman of the Creek National Council to Moty Tiger (Oct. 26, 1909).
343. For example, the Convention voted against war with Germany in World War I, and the tribal leaders
encouraged Mvskoke men to avoid the draft. Moore, supra note 78, at 165. The New York Times reported that
1918 draft resistance in the Creek Nation was rooted in the “Crazy Snake” faction and “pro-German” propaganda. Creek Indians Rise Against the Draft: Three Whites Reported Killed in Oklahoma—Pro German Plot is
Blamed, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1918.
344. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1135.
345. See, e.g., Resolution: Mass Meeting, CHECOTAH CHAUTAUQUA, June 14, 1918.
346. Creek Indians Meet and Elect Chief of Tribe, KOKOMO DAILY TRIBUNE, 1921.
347. Moore notes that:
when the Creek Tribal Towns were queried in 1937 about whether they wished to be
recognized and chartered by the United States government, the Mvskoke leaders responded that they considered it improper for a junior political entity to solicit a senior
one, and offered instead to negotiate the recognition of the United States by the Tribal
Towns.
Moore, supra note 78, at 164.
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which provided authorization for tribal governments in Oklahoma to establish constitutional governments, which would be recognized by the federal government. 348 A local
newspaper reported later that year that a constitutional committee of Creek people was
meeting in Okmulgee, but it does not appear that a constitution was ultimately ratified. 349
Three etvlwv governments (Thlopthlocco, Kialegee and Alabama-Quassarte) independently created constitutions in the 1930s and received the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior. 350 In recognizing these tribal towns, the federal government put its imprimatur on etvwlv rule, documenting the longevity of local governance among the Mvskoke
people. Yet the larger Muscogee Nation itself remained essentially unrecognized by the
federal government. In 1944, twenty-four town leaders convened to draft a new constitution, “but it was never approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” 351 The Council continued to meet semi-regularly, although the federal government considered this Council as
serving in a mere advisory capacity during the mid-twentieth century. 352
In 1951, the newly-appointed Principal Chief, John Davis, drew a line the sand
when it came to the National Council. 353 He refused to recognize the Council, declaring
that “the credentials of the members of the newly-elected session of the Creek Indian
Council or General Convention were improper or irregular.” 354 Chief Davis denounced
the 1944 Constitution and formed a new Creek Indian Council, filling positions with
members he personally appointed from the various tribal towns. 355 This act “caused a
furor in the tribe.” 356 Eventually the Council sued the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Oklahoma state court, seeking to set aside Chief Davis’ actions. 357 The court sided with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and found that the federally-appointed Principal Chief
was “the sole embodiment of [tribal] authority.” 358 The Oklahoma court declined to intervene on behalf of the Council, essentially ruling that Davis’ appointed body was federally authorized by virtue of Davis’ appointment. 359 The implicit lesson to be drawn
from these events is that the unofficial Council was the de facto government of the Creek
towns, and the BIA and Davis went to great lengths to try to suppress it.

348. Okla. Indian Welfare Act. 74th Cong. (2d Sess. 1936).
349. Raiford is Chairman of Indian Committee, THE INDIAN J., Sept. 3, 1936, at 1.
350. The three tribal towns were able to use this status to secure farming leases from the United States in the
1940s. Indians Work on Big Farms, MIAMI DAILY NEWS RECORD, July 8, 1942, at 3.
351. Phillip Deere, Notice!, THE INDIAN J., Mar. 2, 1972, at 1. This proposed constitution “essentially formalized the procedures which had evolved in the Convention for conducting the tribe’s business.” Harjo, 420
F. Supp. at 1137.
352. Creek Indian Council Held at Okmulgee, 54 MCINTOSH COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 1, 1962, at 1. The
Council was probably not recognized by all etvlwv governments. For example, only seventeen etvlwv sent representatives to the 1962 Council meeting. “The Creeks however did not regard Departmental approval as such
necessary for the adoption of the constitution, and therefore continued to operate the Creek Indian Council and
Creek government pursuant to its provisions . . .” Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1137. A 1937 report commissioned by
the federal government suggests that many autonomous etvlwv governments withdrew from participation in the
Council altogether. REPORT ON THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF ASPECTS OF CREEK SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT 1 (1937).
353. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1138 (D.C. 1976).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1139.
358. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1139.
359. Id.
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Despite the denouncements from the BIA and Davis, the elected Council continued
to meet, holding regular sessions until sometime in the late 1950s, and “apparently consider[ing] itself the representative primarily of the full-blood and restricted Creeks.” 360
After Chief Davis’ victory in state court, subsequent Councils were appointed by the
Principal Chiefs and served in an advisory capacity. 361
At that point, the BIA decided to eliminate any further elections of the Principal
Chief, leaving the position to be filled by appointment only at the will of the President of
the United States. 362 As the court in Harjo v. Kleppe tersely wrote, “the affairs of the
Creeks were administered without even a token of democracy.” 363 Popular elections were
reinstated by Congress in 1970, and Claude Cox was elected in September, 1971. 364 By
that time, the unofficial tribal Council was meeting every two months. 365
C. Federal Litigation
Nearly twenty years after the lawsuit against Principal Chief Davis, several representatives from etvlwv governments, unhappy that the federal government continued to
treat Principal Chief Cox as the only leader of the Creek tribe, filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe, in federal district court. 366 The members claimed that federal government officials were violating the 1867 Creek Constitution “by recognizing the Principal Chief as the sole
embodiment of Creek government and allowing him to commit and spend tribal funds
without the previous consent of the Creek National Council.” 367 Resolution of the case
necessarily required the federal court to declare whether the 1867 Constitution of the
Creek Nation had been abolished by federal law. The case, therefore, was a critical turning point in constitutional history for the Creek Nation. 368 Harjo v. Kleppe is notable for
the court’s impressive analysis of Mvskoke history and government as affected by U.S.
federal law. 369
The plaintiffs questioned “the legitimacy of Cox’s authority to disburse tribal
funds and enter into contracts on behalf of the Creek Nation without the approval of the
Council.” 370 The plaintiffs argued that the 1867 Constitution gave “lawmaking power” to
the National Council and put financial affairs under their control. 371 Conclusively, “Con-

360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1139.
364. Principal Chiefs Act of 1970, Oct. 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1091) (authorizing popular election for the Five
Civilized Tribes).
365. History of the Creek Nation, MCINTOSH COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Dec. 20, 1973, at § 2.
366. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Andrus]. The initial lawsuit was filed
against Secretary Kleppe, but by the end of the litigation, the named defendant was Secretary Andrus.
367. Id. at 950-51.
368. Id. at 953.
369. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1119-41 (D.C. 1976).. Woven into the historical analysis was a
review of the Curtis Act (June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495), the Five Tribes Act (Apr. 26, 1926, 34 Stat. 137), the
Appropriations Acts of 1908 (Apr. 30, 1908, 35 Stat. 70) and 1909 (Mar. 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 781), and the Act of
Oct. 22, 1970, (84 Stat. 1091). See id. at 1122, 1126, 1133, 1139-40.
370. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1115.
371. Id.
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gress, between 1866 and 1906, on several occasions specifically recognized the Creek
National Council as the ultimate repository of power within the Creek national government.” 372 Defendants argued that various statutes had “relieved the Creek Nation of sufficient authority that it has been rendered incompetent to handle the affairs of the tribe
under the 1867 Constitution.” 373 Furthermore, “Congress was aware of the fact that the
affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes . . . were being administered by Principal Chiefs or
Governors and therefore ratified this form of government when it enacted the Act of October 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1091.” 374
The Kleppe court noted that “factional rivalries do appear to have played a significant part in motivating plaintiffs to file the suit.” 375 Yet the “only relevant” issue for the
court was whether the plaintiffs’ challenge consisted of “internal tribal issues” or if it
arose under U.S. constitutional law. 376 This case was not questioning “the propriety of
tribal actions, but the legality of actions of federal officials pursuant to federal statutes,”
in dealing with only one branch of the tribal government. 377 Ultimately the court agreed
with the plaintiffs: the federal government had acted illegally through the “policy and
practice of the Interior Department in recognizing and dealing with defendant Cox, Principal Chief of the Creek Nation, as the sole embodiment of the Creek tribal government,
and “in refusing to recognize, facilitate or deal with a Creek National Council as a coordinate branch of the tribal government responsible for certain legislative and financial
functions.” 378
The federal court provided historical examples of “factionalism,” or power struggles between rival parties, that were similar to what was at issue in that case and is at issue today. 379 Thus, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s contemporary re-acknowledgement
was rooted in the same kind of factionalism that had once served as the foundation for
reciprocity and balance. The white and red sides of the Creek spirit were finally vindicated in the colonizer’s court. The Mvskoke people then had to re-establish a government
structure that would meet the needs of a twentieth century tribal government, but philosophical differences made that very difficult.
PART VI: AUTONOMY: 1976–PRESENT
The opinion in Harjo v. Kleppe is unusual in that a federal judge mandated a tribal
constitutional convention. 380 Although the opinion recognized an ongoing effort on the
part of Principal Chief Cox’s administration to draft a constitution for the Creek nation,

372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1117.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added).
379. Id. at 1138.
380. The opinion is rather detailed in how the constitutional development process was to work. In addition
to drafting the new constitution, the judge also ordered that the commission carry out “an educational program
consisting at least of literature and public discussions held throughout the Creek nation, designed to make the
vote a meaningful and fully informed one.” Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1146. A similar outcome played out for the
Osage Nation twenty years later. Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 1997).
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the federal judge was concerned that the process had no input from the Creek political
body as a whole. 381 Therefore, the opinion required the creation of a five-member commission to draft a fresh document with more democratic input. 382 During the next three
years, Claude Cox’s administration advocated for a new constitution that would more
closely mirror Oklahoma’s constitution as opposed to the 1867 model. 383 Chief Cox opposed the inclusion of etvlwv governments as part of the government structure. 384 A draft
constitution was approved by the commission in August 1979. 385 Two months later, the
new Muscogee (Creek) Nation constitution was ratified by a slim majority. 386 However,
participation was low, and only 30 percent of the “qualified voters” actually voted for the
new constitution. 387
A. 1979 Constitution
The 1979 Creek Constitution differs from the 1867 Muscogee Constitution in several significant ways. First, it defines citizenship based on federal government allotment
rolls. 388 Second, it creates a unicameral legislature with no role for etvlwv governments. 389 Third, it sets minimum “blood quantums” for government officials. 390
Like the 1867 Constitution, the 1979 Constitution provides for three government
branches. First, executive power rests with the Principal Chief. 391 The Chief has enumerated powers, including agency appointment power and preparation of an annual budget. 392 Yet, both of these functions require the Chief to act “[w]ith the advice and consent”
of the Muscogee (Creek) National Council. 393 The Muscogee (Creek) National Council
is the tribe’s legislative body. 394 This unicameral body makes policy, yet the Council
381. Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1144-46.
382. The irony of a federal judge ordering a tribal government to exercise certain kinds of self-governing
authority was not lost on the judge. He noted that such an order “would be so similar to ordering the convening
of a national council that the same problems discussed above in that regard are again applicable.” Id. at 1145.
But Judge Bryant went on to explain that the federal court had a responsibility “to ensure that its order results
in compliance with the law,” and that this order was the only way to do so. Id. at 1145-46.
383. Moore, supra note 78, at 184. One report said that the constitution “will be patterned after Oklahoma’s
constitution.” Creek Chief Promoting Tribal Tourist Attraction Near City, MCINTOSH COUNTY DEMOCRAT,
Dec. 14, 1972, at 1. Phillip Deere, a Mvskoke citizen who became nationally and internationally known as a
spiritual leader for the American Indian Movement in the 1970s, was vocal in objecting to the further assimilation of Mvskoke national governing values that were proposed in the 1970s. In the debate about the 1970s Constitution, a report said that “Deer [sic] contends council members should represent the 44 ‘towns’ of the old
nation.” Creek Tribal Constitution Draws Opposition, JOPLIN GLOBE, May 27, 1975, at B1.
384. Id. (quoting Claude Cox as saying “[t]he town setup is impractical. Thlopthlocco town owns property
and is organized to some extent but it is torn like a wagon sheet by faction and strife. A big cumbersome council from all those towns would never agree on anything, never get anything done”).
385. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONST., Certificate of Results of Election.
386. Id. ¶ 2.
387. It was hardly an overwhelming majority—the new constitution was ratified by vote of 1,896 for and
1,694 against. Id. The Secretary of the Interior approved the 1979 Constitution.
388. Id. art. III, § 2.
389. Id. art. VI, § 2.
390. Id. art. III, § 4. The preamble is richer in both form and substance than the 1867 preamble, notably giving credit to “Almighty God, our Creator” which reflects the importance of Christianity for many Mvskoke
people. Id. at pmbl.
391. Id. art. V, § 1, cl. a.
392. Id. art. V, § 3.
393. Id. art. V, §§ 2(b), 3.
394. Id. art. VI, § 2.
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must present each bill to the Chief for approval and signature or rejection, and “[e]very
ordinance, order, resolution, or other act intended to reflect the policy” of the Nation
must be signed by the Chief. 395
The structure of the National Council, now popularly elected by geographic division, disenfranchised the etvwlv governments as constitutional constituents, although Article II indicates that “[t]his Constitution shall not in any way abolish the rights and privileges of persons in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation to organize tribal towns or recognize its
Muscogee (Creek) traditions.” 396 The 1979 Constitution allows for certain Creek “chartered communities” to be affiliated and recognized by the national government. 397
Judicial power is vested in a tribal Supreme Court under Article VII, by far the
shortest article in the Constitution. 398 The six members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Principal Chief and subject to majority approval by the Council. 399 The
judiciary also includes “such inferior courts as the National Council may from time to
time ordain.” 400 The Muscogee Nation began developing its court system based on this
constitution in 1982.
Meanwhile, many Mvskoke people continue to adhere to traditional etvlwv traditions, although the majority of Mvskoke people today identify as Christian. 401 The etvlwv
governments are now known as “ceremonial towns” in English, which would suggest
that they lack any real political authority. However, individual etvlwv continue to exercise ceremonial and political authority today. “Each Ceremonial Ground has officers that
correspond to a modern President or Governor, Legislator, Administrator, Judges and
Soldiers or Policemen.” 402
B. Constitutional Litigation Post-1979
The current Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court is creating its own body of constitutional jurisprudence, but has struggled to develop a jurisprudence which embraces traditional Mvskoke values. Some of the earliest decisions issued by the court show tremendous deference to the American legal system; the more recent cases show less reliance
on American law and herald the emergence of a unique, twenty-first century Mvskoke
constitutional jurisprudence. 403 This time period also demonstrates the continuing internal struggles of Mvskoke (Creek) governance. Instead of Red/White, Upper/Lower or
Canadian/Arkansas divisions, however, tension surfaces as inter-branch disputes.
The court has struggled with constitutional interpretation since the 1979 Constitution was ratified, issuing numerous decisions concerning power struggles between the
395. Id. art. VI, § 6(a), cl. c.
396. Id. art II, § 5.
397. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1-101.
398. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONST. art. VII.
399. Id. art. VII, § 2.
400. Id. art. VII, § 1. The National Council established the district court via resolution in 1981. Thlopthlocco
Tribal Town v. Tomah, 8 Okla. Trib. 451 (Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 2004).
401. Andrea C. Walker & Tim Thompson, Muscogee Creek Spirituality and Meaning of Death, 59 OMEGA
129, 135 (2009).
402. Moore, Government Pre-Columbian, supra note 94, at XII.
403. Because the Mvskoke (Creek) government is not an arm of the federal government, it is not bound by
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-85 (1896).
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other two branches of government. 404 Major power struggles between the Principal Chief
and the National Council have arisen in the context of elections, procedural law-making,
and contracts with private companies. 405
Clearly, the court has a centuries-old system of tribal common law as a starting
point in its journey to fashion a tribal-centric jurisprudence in harmony with its traditions
and cosmogony. On one hand, many of the opinions mention traditional tribal governing
principles. On the other hand, those same opinions tend to rely almost exclusively on
federal substantive law in reaching its final decisions. In the following sections, we consider how the court is developing a constitutional jurisprudence blending these two
worlds. In the earliest cases, the court exhibited tremendous deference to and admiration
for the U.S. Supreme Court and federal law. 406
1. Deference to American Law
In the first major constitutional decisions of its existence, the contemporary Muscogee Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on American constitutional legal principles. The first case, Beaver v. National Council, was decided in 1986. 407 This decision
was followed four years later by another case, Preferred Management v. National Council, in which the court continued to espouse American legal principles. 408 These deci404. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gouge, 8 Okla. Trib. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2003); Burden v. Cox, 1 Okla. Trib. 247 (Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1988). The 1979 Constitution allowed suits between
tribal members to originate in the Supreme Court, which has meant that the justices are oftentimes making decisions that do not have the benefit of lower court review or jury trials. The Muscogee Supreme Court is certainly not the only tribal court to engage in judicial review of fundamental constitutional disputes over the past
century. When constitutional cases are litigated in tribal court today, a tribal judiciary typically hears a case of
first impression regarding the founding documents of the tribe. As such, they must necessarily engage in the
interpretation of words or phrases in the tribal constitution that have never before been interpreted—there is no
binding written precedent. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21
VT. L. REV. 7, 9 (1996). Of course, any young court (including the early U.S. Supreme Court) struggles when
there is no binding precedent. See, e.g., ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 5 (1968) (showing how Marshall cited little case precedent and focused his constitutional jurisprudence on the document’s common sense meanings). For example, many U.S. Supreme Court opinions have
referenced English common law even though it has no binding authority on the United States. However, many
tribal courts have applied American constitutional rulings as if they were binding precedent for the tribal government. This trend has raised concerns in the pro-sovereignty legal community, which seeks to connect tribal
jurisprudence with a tribe’s history and traditions. Some tribal jurists have advanced the pro-sovereignty
movement’s goals by explicitly rejecting Anglo-American cases when they conflict with tribal principles. See,
e.g., Village of Mishongnovi v. Humeyestewa, 1 Am. Tribal L. 295, 301-02 (Hopi App. Ct. 1998) (finding that
the “restrictive nature of Federal standing doctrine is antithetical to Hopi traditions of open dispute resolution”); see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Marchand, 33 Indian L. Rep. 6036 (rejecting the Crawford v.
Washington rule about confrontation of witnesses).
405. Pommersheim notes that such tribal court decisions “are fraught with possibilities for confrontation and
government crisis.” Pommersheim, supra note 404, at 14.
406. A Muscogee statute provides a hierarchy of reliance on external laws. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION
CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 1-103. Courts are to apply first Mvskoke law. Id. § 1-103(A). If Mvskoke law does not
provide an answer to the legal question, the court may then apply federal law. Id. § 1-103(B). If neither
Mvskoke law nor federal law contains the answer, then the court may rely on Oklahoma law. Id. § 1-103(C).
407. Beaver v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation Council, 1 Okla. Trib. 57 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
1986). Beaver arose from a disputed election. Id. at 61. In 1985, Perry Beaver was elected Second Chief in a
runoff election. Id. at 64. The Muscogee Creek National Council wanted to hold a new special election for the
position, presumably because they were unhappy with Beaver’s election. Id. at 64-66. The Council invalidated
the initial election with legislation and initiated a new special election. Id. at 64. Beaver sued to enjoin the special election, lost in the tribal district court, and appealed to the Muscogee Supreme Court. Id.
408. Preferred Mgmt. Corp. v. Nat’l Council of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 2 Okla. Trib. 37 (S. Ct. of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation 1990).
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sions used basic American constitutional rules to decide cases rather than Muscogee
common law. For example, in Beaver, the court determined that a Council-ordered special election was unconstitutional, but did not rely on Mvskoke common law or history to
reach that conclusion. The court lavished praise on American law and used the opinion to
wax poetic about the superiority of the U.S. Constitution. 409 Instead of looking to the
Muscogee (Creek) Constitution and the tribe’s own historical government to determine
whether the special election was constitutional, the court declared that the constitution
was “patterned after the Constitution of the United States of America . . . [t]herefore, the
decisions of the United States courts having to do with the historical separation of governmental powers shall apply with equal force to the government of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation.” 410
The court, in the space of a four-page opinion, essentially discounted any use of
traditional culture or justice as a basis for jurisprudence. 411 The ordinance allowing for a
special election was invalid not because it was inconsistent with Muscogee traditional
and governing philosophy, but because the U.S. Constitution and jurisprudence holds
that the legislature may not act as a judiciary in matters of elections. 412
In 1990, the Muscogee Supreme Court went a step further in its deference to U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. In Preferred Management Corp. v. National Council, the court
was faced with a dispute that raised an important question about the court’s personal jurisdiction over non-tribal parties. 413 As an initial matter, the defendant, Preferred Management, argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because it was a
non-tribal entity. 414 The court rejected this argument by relying on three sources of
law—two U.S. Supreme Court cases and one tribal ordinance. 415 The emphasis on the
Supreme Court opinions allowed the court to bypass crucial questions of inherent authority. Instead of using the opportunity to declare their inherent right to hear cases arising
out of the tribal constitution, the court instead stated that its authority to hear the case
originated from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montana v. United States, which
was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981 (the Muscogee court refers to this decision as “controlling”). 416 As almost an afterthought, the Muscogee court mentioned tribal
409. Beaver, 1 Okla. Trib. at 65. According to the court, the U.S. Constitution “is truly acclaimed to be the
greatest literary achievement in civilized society; only the Holy Bible deserves status above it.” Id.
410. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
411. Indeed, the opinion seems somewhat dismissive of any reference to Mvskoke traditions:
We too have dreams about our sacred campfires, bountiful forests and streams and roaming herds of buffalos, but we awaken in a vastly changed world. We put our Nation and
people at a distinct disadvantage in competing with progressive society unless we adopt
the legal ways and means by which all business is conducted in America.
Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
412. Id. at 63.
413. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 43-45. The dispute arose when the National Council refused to
honor a purported contract with Preferred Management (a private company which provided management services for tribal health care facilities) that an executive officer had arranged. The case implicated separation of
powers concerns about the national budget, since the executive branch allegedly entered into monetary obligations without full consent of the Council in violation of the constitution. The private company wanted to see the
contract enforced; the Council argued that it was invalid as a matter of tribal law.
414. Id. at 43.
415. Id. at 43-45.
416. Id. Montana v. United States is a seminal federal case on tribal civil jurisdictional authority. In 1981,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montana that a tribe has the authority to regulate “the activities of non-
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statutory law, which authorized jurisdiction over non-Indians under conditions expressed
in the Montana decision. 417
The court did some independent tribal constitutional analysis, but relied almost exclusively on American legal authority. 418 There was no discussion of whether an American conception of a checks and balances system was consistent with traditional government, though the court did note that maintaining three separate branches of government
would be good for the Nation in the long run. 419
The dissenting opinion in Preferred Management is also worth mentioning for two
reasons: First, it further demonstrates the deference the court was giving to the U.S. Constitution during this period. 420 Dissenting Justice Howe noted that “[t]he Judicial Branch
must not be made a political activist on either side of this conflict, for ours is only to
faithfully adhere to the Constitution of the Creek Nation and Great American Constitution which governs us all.” 421 The level of reverence given to the U.S. Constitution reflects the other decisions of this period. The second reason the dissent is worth noting is
that Justice Howe accurately predicted future conflicts between the legislative and executive branches of the Muscogee government. 422 Justice Howe believed that the National
Council did not have standing to bring the suit in the first place. 423 He wrote:
The National Council has the Constitutional right to hire independent
counsel in the furtherance of its lawful duties, but that right is grossly
abused and perverted when the National Council hires an attorney to
members who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings,
contracts, leases or other arrangements.” Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). The Muscogee
court relied on this holding as the basis for jurisdiction over the matter. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at
43. The court also cited the “minimum contacts” doctrine in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. See Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
417. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 44-45 (the statute “mandates assertion of jurisdiction over nonmembers when disputes involve either: 1. the political security of the Nation; 2. the economic security of the
Nation and its members; or 3. the health, safety and welfare of tribal members”). After establishing jurisdiction,
the court then determined that Article V, Section 3 of the Muscogee Constitution prohibited the executive
branch from entering into a contract without the approval of the National Council. Id. at 46-47 (Article V, Section 3 states that “[t]he Principal Chief shall prepare the annual budget requests and supplements thereto and
with the advice and consent of the National Council administer funds within the control of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation”). The court held that since the contract with Preferred Management had not been approved by
the National Council, it was void ab initio. Id. at 47.
418. For example, one of Preferred Management’s arguments was that ruling in favor of the Council would
eviscerate the power of the executive. Id. The court responded by noting that such a system works for other
governing bodies, including the American government. Id. One practitioner journal article suggested that Preferred Management was the Muscogee Nation’s Marbury v. Madison moment. Ed Edmondson & June E. Edmondson, The Creek Nation’s Marbury v. Madison: Preferred Management Corp. v. National Council of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 77 (1991). But, a closer reading of Preferred Mgmt. Corp.
suggests otherwise. The court did not rely on inherent judicial review authority, but instead relied on federal
case law to establish the authority of judicial review. See generally Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. 37.
419. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 45.
420. It was not just the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court that was showing great esteem for federal law during this period. The Muskogee (Creek) District Court stated in one decision that “we are certainly more fortunate than the founders of the United States Constitution as we have their wisdom, knowledge, and experience
to follow.” Cox v. Kamp, 5 Okla. Trib. 530, 535 (Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1991). In addition, perhaps more
telling, the district court stated, “[w]e cannot believe that the founders of this [Muscogee] Constitution intended
it to be greatly different from the Constitution of the United States.” Id.
421. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 49 (Howe, J., dissenting).
422. Id.
423. Id.
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bring lawsuits against members of its executive branch of government.
To give legal standing to such an abuse is unconstitutional and invites
chaos in tribal government. 424
His prediction of chaos in the tribal government would be borne out in the following
years.
2. Transition Period: Less deference to American law
A series of decisions beginning in 1993 can be distinguished from the earlier period because the court provided some level of independent Mvskoke legal analysis. The
1993 case, Courtwright v. July, implicated concerns about the vertical separation of
powers in the Creek Constitution, namely how the constitutions of statutorily-created
“chartered communities” within the tribe would interact with the Muscogee Nation’s
Constitution. 425 The case involved a dispute over a voting amendment made to the
Checotah Indian Community (“CIC”) Constitution. 426 The voting amendment restricted
CIC voters to those who had attended three or more community meetings. 427
The Supreme Court ruled that the community constitutional amendment violated
the laws of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. 428 The court found that voting was a “fundamental right” by citing Supreme Court precedent. 429 Then, the court used what amounts
to a strict scrutiny analysis of the amendment, holding that the Checotah Board of Directors did not have a compelling government interest in restricting the vote to persons who
had attended three consecutive community meetings. 430 There was no analysis of the
424. Id.
425. While the traditional etvwlv governments are not formal constitutional constituents under the 1979 Constitution, smaller groups of Mvskoke people have organized local entities until Title XI, Chapter 1 of the Muscogee Code. These “chartered communities” can then receive grants and other resources to establish local
community centers and cultural meeting places. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3-101-3204. Chartered communities can draft constitutions, which must be approved by the Principal Chief. Id. at § 1101.
426. Courtwright v. July, 3 Okla. Trib. 132, 138-40 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 1993). In 1987,
the CIC Constitution was amended by the Checotah Board of Directors to limit participation in community
elections to members who attended three consecutive community meetings. Id. at 139-40. Vernon Courtwright,
a member of CIC who was ineligible to vote under the amendment, brought suit in district court, claiming that
the amendment was improperly passed and that the new law violated the Muscogee Constitution. Id. at 141.
Courtwright lost his case in the Muscogee District Court, but the decision triggered enough concerns about
constitutional order that the Supreme Court allowed the Attorney General to intervene and appeal the decision.
Id.
427. Id. at 139-40.
428. Courtwright, 3 Okla. Trib. at 141. The court determined that the CIC amendment violated the Muscogee Constitution because it denied citizens their “inalienable rights to equal protection and due process of the
laws.” Id. The court’s reasoning is a bit confusing. The court held first, that since the CIC Constitution required
that amendments be passed by a majority vote of members and that no such vote had taken place, the amendment was invalid. Id. at 143. That holding is fairly straightforward, but the court expanded the holding to say
that charter community constitutions could provide “more rights and liberties than the Creek Nation’s Constitution, but in no event may [they] grant less.” Id. at 143. Since the CIC constitutional amendment process only
required a pure majority, it was more “restrictive” than the Muscogee Constitution which requires amendments
to pass by a two-thirds vote. Id. at 143. The court also held that requiring a citizen to attend a certain number of
meetings in order to have the right to vote denied Checotah members equal protection under the law. Id. at 14647.
429. Id. at 146 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964)).
430. Id. at 144-45. Checotah’s vice chairman apparently testified that the purpose behind the CIC amendment was to “prevent a group of individuals from attending a community meeting and swaying the vote in the
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Muscogee (Creek) Constitution, nor any mention of Muscogee (Creek) tradition. The decision largely follows similar analysis by federal courts and continues the pattern of using American law to interpret the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution. The decision does not
include any reference to the traditional etvlwv structure, nor the history of the tribe as a
confederated government.
However, there is an aspect of Courtwright that points to a new level of independent constitutional analysis by the court. Up until that point, the court had based its jurisdictional authority on outside rules and reasoning from federal law. In Courtwright, the
court turned away from this jurisdictional reasoning and instead relied on its status as the
judicial branch of the government. 431 The court stated:
A constitution, by its very nature, serves as a limitation on the power of
the government. Without judicial interpretation, however, it may be
construed to have as many different meanings as it has readers. Thus,
once a case or controversy concerning the meaning of a constitutional
provision reaches the courts, then the courts become the final arbiter as
to the constitutionality of governmental actions as they relate to the
constitution which empowers them. In other words, if the legislature
does not provide for firm constraints on official action, then courts
must do so. The question becomes, then, whether the amendment to Article V, Section 5 of the Checotah constitution offends the constitutional integrity of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. 432
That was the first indication by the court that its power was established by the
1979 Constitution and the inherent authority of the tribe, not simply because the United
States conferred or recognized such power. Thus, 1993 marks the emergence of a contemporary Mvskoke-specific jurisprudence.
Five years after Courtwright, the Muscogee Supreme Court again distanced itself
from the early deference to U.S. opinions in what may be the only “Big Tobacco” tribal
case. 433 The Muscogee (Creek) Nation brought suit against various large tobacco companies in tribal court using the same principles that many states had used in similar suits. 434
Not surprisingly, the tobacco companies argued that the Nation lacked personal jurisdiction over their companies. 435 Once the Muscogee Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional question of standing, it dismissed the case. 436
direction of the group.” Id. The court found such reasoning wholly unpersuasive, and also noted that “mandating attendance at a meeting . . . potentially interferes with other requirements of daily life such as attendance at
one’s job, and attention to one’s family.” Id. at 146.
431. Id. at 142-43.
432. Id.
433. See Shelly Grunsted, An Effective Smoke Screen?—The Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s Civil Complaint
Against Big Time Tobacco and the Battle of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 567 (1998).
434. Complaint, Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Am. Tobacco Co., 5 Okla. Trib. 401 (D. Ct. of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation 1998) (No. CV-97-27). Namely, the tribe alleged that the major tobacco companies had engaged in numerous torts which resulted in harm to tribal citizens. Id. at 108-14.
435. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Dist. Court, 5 Okla. Trib. 447 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation 1998).
436. See id.
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Ironically, in deciding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the tobacco companies under Creek and federal law, the court began to carve out more constitutional independence, noting that “any federal authorities considered in this matter are
limited to review of their persuasive value.” 437 Still, there was very little Mvskoke
(Creek) precedent upon which to rely, so nearly all of the cited law was federal. 438
By the early 2000s, the Muscogee Supreme Court had fielded fundamental questions of separation of powers, jurisdiction over non-Mvskoke companies, and the relationship between the national government and chartered communities. Constitutional
disagreements continued. A 2002 case involved an equal protection challenge to the tribal election laws. 439 It was here that the court began to distinguish its view of jurisdiction
from previous decisions, the first instance of the court really building on its own constitutional precedent. 440 The court rejected the constitutional challenge, ruling that the statute met the rational basis standard. 441
Throughout the next few years, the court continued to incrementally turn to
Mvskoke law in place of American law as internal constitutional disputes intensified. 442
Two significant cases, Ellis I and Ellis II, involved disputes between the executive
branch and the legislative branch. 443 In both cases, the court ruled in favor of the executive branch, citing separation of powers as a crucial test of constitutionality. 444
Ellis I began as a contract dispute. 445 Essentially, the case was a question of
whether or not the National Council could, through legislation, mandate that the Principal Chief act in a certain way with regard to gaming contracts. 446 For the first time, the
court analyzed only the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution language in coming to a decision. 447 The court laid out a constitutional tenet: The Muscogee (Creek) Constitution
must be strictly construed when the language is plain. 448 In addition, the court made numerous references to its own previous decisions, recognizing tribal court precedent as the
preeminent binding authority. 449 Finally, the court made special note that the Muscogee
437. See id.
438. The court’s citations included: Mallard v. United States Dist. Court., 490 U.S. 296 (1989); Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980); United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1996); In re
Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d. 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
439. In re Constitutionality of NCA-01-115, 7 Okla. Trib. 366 (S. Ct of Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2002).
440. NCA-01-115 required that employees of the Nation take a leave of absence from work if they wanted to
run for office within the Muscogee government. Id.
441. Id. While the Muscogee Constitution was determined to be the controlling law, there was no more mention of how a rational basis review was required by the constitution, or why the law violated it. The court only
noted that the Muscogee Constitution was fashioned after the U.S. Constitution and has always supported the
separation of powers. Id.
442. E.g., Oliver v. Nat’l Council, 9 Okla. Trib. 475 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2006).
443. Ellis v. Nat’l Council, 9 Okla. Trib. 190 (S. Ct of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2006) [hereinafter Ellis
I] and Ellis v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation National Council, No. SC 06-07 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2007) (opinion and order of citation for contempt) [hereinafter Ellis II].
444. See Ellis I, at 196-99; Ellis II, at 5-11.
445. See Ellis I.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 198-99. Plain language is a fairly standard method of interpretation. An earlier district court opinion in an unrelated case had also adopted the “plain language” standard. Burden v. Cox, 1 Okla. Trib. 247, 254
(Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1988); see also Cox v. Kamp, 5 Okla. Trib. 530, 534 (Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1991
(agreeing that “the Constitution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation must be strictly construed and interpreted”).
449. See Ellis I, at 196-202.
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(Creek) people have had a long history of practicing separation of powers. 450
One year after Ellis I was decided, the same parties were once again before the Supreme Court, this time because of salary changes instituted by the National Council. 451
Ellis II suggests that the era of the court’s deference to American jurisprudence may be
coming to an end. 452 The court found in favor of the Principal Chief and ruled that the
National Council had overstepped its constitutional boundaries. 453 In Ellis II, the court
relied almost solely on the Muscogee Constitution and case law in reaching its decision. 454
3. Progressive Period – The Emergence of Independent
Constitutional Jurisprudence
Ongoing constitutional strife and internal disputes culminated in a 2008 constitutional amendment process. 455 During the 2008 convention, over one hundred constitutional amendments were proposed. 456 Less than fifteen received enough votes from the
convention to proceed to the national ballot, and twelve amendments appeared on the
2009 ballot. 457 On November 7, 2009, Mvskoke (Creek) citizens voted to ratify eleven
amendments to the 1979 Constitution. 458 A significant dispute has arisen regarding both
the substance of some of the amendments, as well as the procedural process used by the
Constitutional Commission and the election board to circulate and certify the amendments. 459
The proposed amendments were controversial for a variety of reasons—but two in
particular have become the subject of litigation in tribal courts. First, one amendment
changed the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The 1979 language allowed suits
between tribal officials to originate in the Supreme Court. 460 Amendment A114 required
450. Id. At the same time, however, the court still relied heavily on federal law in coming to its decisions.
Specifically, the court used a U.S. Supreme Court case to establish the plain language standard. Id. at 198 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989)). The court also pointed out, once again, that the Muscogee Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, the Muscogee courts should be consistent with the U.S. courts. See Ellis I, at 197-98.
451. Ellis II, at 1-2.
452. The Court also had strong words for the continued political strife between the Chief and the Council
and vowed that it will not be intimidated by either branch of government. Id.
456. See Ellis II, at 20-21.
454. There are a few passing mentions of U.S. court cases and governmental decisions, but these references
are not relied upon, nor is the Muscogee Constitution compared to the United States Constitution. See generally
Ellis II.
455. The convention was governed by Article IX, Section 2 of the 1979 Muscogee Constitution. MUSCOGEE
(CREEK) CONST. art IX, § 2.
456. Clifton Adcock, The Tribe Will Hold its First Constitutional Convention in at Least a Century This
Weekend,
TULSA
WORLD,
Nov.
6,
2008,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Creeks_to_hold_historic_meeting/20081106_11_a11_hthetr244772.
457. George Tiger, Creek Nation Votes Today on Proposed Amendments, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX, Nov. 6,
2009,
http://muskogeephoenix.com/columns/x546267732/Creek-Nation-votes-today-on-proposedamendments?start:int=15.
458. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Bd., No. SC 09-10, at 2 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
2010) (opinion and order). Two amendments were not presented: A78 and A99.
459. In 2012, the National Council passed 12-074, which declared that the 2009 Constitutional Amendment
process was fraudulent. Sterling Cooper, Huff Elected Second Speaker at Regular Session May 19, 42
MUSCOGEE NATION NEWS, June 1, 2012, at 1-2 (on file with the author).
460. Thus, many of the constitutional decisions decided by the court since 1979 did not have the benefit of
lower court inquiry or fact-finding. It may be that the drafters of the amendments were seeking to add another
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such suits to originate in district court. 461 Second, amendment A67 reduced the size of
the National Council—a controversial move that would necessarily mean that some
council members may no longer have a seat in the government. Moreover, A67 changed
the structure for voting for representatives to an “at-large” system as opposed to voting
by geographic district.
After the constitutional amendment election, council member Robert Trepp (along
with other members of the National Council) filed suit in the Supreme Court to enjoin
implementation of the amendments, alleging that the certification of the amendments
amounted to illegal changes to the constitution. 462 At first, the Supreme Court declined to
hear the case, stating that it did not have original jurisdiction over the matter (pursuant to
the new amendment) 463 and ordered Trepp to file his lawsuit in District Court. The Supreme Court furthered ordered the National Council to appoint a special judge to hear the
case. 464
Over the next year, the National Council declined to confirm any of the Chief’s
nominated special judges. 465 By December 2010, with the fate of the amendments hanging in the balances, the Supreme Court decided it had to rule on the matter. 466 The significance of this case is not only the fact that the court used the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution and court precedent to justify all its holdings, but that the Court also makes a point
of distinguishing the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution from the U.S. Constitution.
In order to resolve the dispute, the court claimed original jurisdiction over the case,
even though they had denied it previously in spite of A114. 467 Ultimately, the court determined that the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution and previous decisions by the court allowed a claim of original jurisdiction in the case, even though the district court had not
had an opportunity to rule on the matter. 468 The court distinguished the Creek Constitution, explaining:
By way of comparison, the United States Supreme Court is limited in
its exercise of original jurisdiction. (citation omitted). No such limitation on Supreme Court jurisdiction exists in this Nation’s Constitution.
As such, the appropriate exercise of original jurisdiction is a matter of

layer of court review in such important cases.
461. Amendment A114, Proposed Amendments to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution 5 (on file with
author).
462. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Bd., No. SC 09-10 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Dec. 3,
2010) (opinion and order). Amendment procedures for the constitution are outlined in Article XI. MUSCOGEE
(CREEK) CONST. art. XI.
463. Codified at Art. VII, Sec. 6. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONST. art VII, § 6.
464. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Bd., No. SC 09-10, at 2 (Muscogee (Creek) Dec. 3, 2010) (opinion
and order). District Court Judge Patrick Moore had been one of the Constitution Commission members, so he
recused himself from hearing the case. Id. at 9 n.14. The court also issued a restraining order, preventing the
Election Board from certifying the amendments until the matter was settled in court. Id. at 3.
465. Perhaps the council members believed that appointing a special judge to hear the case would be an
acknowledgement of the district court’s authority, which in turn would mean acknowledging that the amendment process itself was legitimate.
466. Id. at 2.
467. Id.
468. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10, at 8 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
Dec. 3, 2010) (opinion and order).
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prudent judicial policy within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation framework. This Nation’s Constitution vests all judicial power within the
Supreme Court and other inferior courts. As the Supreme Court is the
ultimate authority within this Nation’s judiciary, this Court must be the
final arbiter of when the exercise of original jurisdiction is proper. 469
The court in Trepp established that public policy concerns (such as confusion
about the constitution) can create original jurisdiction. 470 The court ultimately dismissed
Trepp’s suit on standing grounds. 471
This is an important decision because it reflects the court’s official disapproval of
the seemingly endless series of lawsuits between the legislative and executive branches. 472 The court in Trepp referred to Justice Howe’s dissent in Preferred Management
and held that the other branches of government only have limited ability to sue in court,
and that “[t]he ultimate source of authority in Mvskoke government is the people.” 473
That holding not only provides the court with a way to prevent further litigation, but also
shows an analysis with an eye towards tribal tradition and values. 474 Only three nonMvskoke cases are cited in the opinion.
Trepp, then, is not so much a turning point in Mvskoke constitutional jurisprudence as it is the culmination of a movement by the court towards self-determination. In
particular, the analysis throughout the clarifying memo relies on the Mvskoke Constitution and the court’s own precedent. The court went from going out of its way to defer to
the U.S. Constitution to explaining why the Mvskoke Constitution provides the court
with different roles and powers. It is a significant change in court policy and provides a
new foundation from which a unique Mvskoke jurisprudence can continue to grow.
The Trepp decision also raised a significant procedural question for the court. Only
five justices participated in the opinion (with three writing for the majority and two dissenting); there was one abstaining justice. 475 The dissenters issued a memorandum which
claimed that the abstaining judge should be considered a dissenter and therefore the
judgment was tied three to three. 476 Statutory law says that “a judgment or decision of
the Supreme Court requires the approval of a minimum of four (4) justices.” 477 The majority in Trepp wrote a clarifying memo in order to explain that an abstaining judge is not
469. Id. at 6 n.8.
470. Id. at 2.
471. Id. at 24.
472. Id. at 14-15 (describing it as “a never-ending parade of litigation”).
473. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10, at 15 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Dec. 3, 2010) (opinion and order).
474. Codified Court rules indicate that "[a] judgment or decision of the Supreme Court requires the approval
of a minimum of four (4) justices." MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION S. CT. R. APP. P. 22. The majority in Trepp
wrote a clarifying memo in order to explain that an abstaining judge is not automatically dissenting from the
opinion. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
Dec. 3, 2010) (clarifying addendum to Dec. 3, 2010 majority opinion). Therefore, from the court's perspective
the majority opinion stands and the amendments were ratified by the Nation.
475. See Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
Dec. 3, 2010) (clarifying addendum to Dec. 3, 2010 majority opinion).
476. Id. (response to the Dec. 3rd filing by Justice Jonodev Chaudhuri, Justice Amos Mcnac, and Justice
Houston Shirley).
477. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION S. CT. R. APP. P. 22
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automatically dissenting from the opinion. 478 Therefore, from the court’s perspective, the
majority opinion stood and the amendments were ratified by the Nation.
Today, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation continues to struggle with fundamental constitutional questions. Recently, parties who are unsatisfied with decisions in tribal court
have begun to appeal intra-tribal matters to federal courts in Oklahoma. 479 This is a troubling development, as federal oversight has historically been a grossly ineffective means
of furthering Mvskoke self-governance. One of the founding principles of Muscogee
self-governance is enshrined in the 1979 Preamble—namely, the people shall aspire to
“strengthen and preserve self and local Government.” 480 Federal court intervention has
the potential to steer the Nation away from self-determination. 481
One of the virtues that is often mentioned when American-style separation of powers is praised is that it makes government more insulated from tyranny. It must be remembered that the American Constitution was drafted in the aftermath of a revolution,
and so independence was the primary motivation. Many tribal constitutions were drafted
in the aftermath of removal and allotment, so survival was the primary motivation. If the
Mvskoke government is arguably insulating itself from tyranny through the development
of constitutional law, the tyranny largely originates from the United States. Thus, turning
to the federal courts to resolve Mvskoke disputes can be said to be a fundamentally unconstitutional strategy. The better strategy, one more consistent with self-determination,
is to cultivate Mvskoke-centric jurisprudence.

CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTUREOF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION
A perfect replication of the intricate, interconnected governments found in preremoval, traditional Mvskoke government is unlikely to emerge from this twenty-first
body politic. 482 Such a pure restoration would be impractical; only a few tribal towns
remain intact, and most of those towns exercise only ceremonial authority in their respective communities. Moreover, many of the specific governmental styles of the pre1500s era would likely not be well-adapted for contemporary culture and technology.
Even had the Mvskoke not been forced to change its governing bodies and legal structures, it would have gone through its own internal structural changes to respond to
changing times. However, many themes and tenets of core traditional Mvskoke values
remain and must continue to be cultivated in the jurisprudence of the Court. The Court
itself has acknowledged as much: “For our tribal society to function properly, we must
honor and respect the respective roles of others. Our Constitution is based on our societal
values, as a people, and that interconnectedness lays out the separate powers and duties
478. Trepp, No. SC 09-10 (clarifying addendum to Dec. 3, 2010 majority opinion).
479. Fife v. Moore, 808 F. Supp. 2d. 1310 (E.D. Okla. 2011) (enjoining the Muscogee District Court from
exercising criminal jurisdiction over theft-related crimes involving former tribal officials).
480. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONST. pmbl.
481. Seneca scholar Robert B. Porter explains, “[i]n order for indigenous people to maintain and redevelop
meaningful choices for their future, they must dedicate themselves to conducting their affairs in reliance upon
their own traditions.” Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 297 (1997).
482. See Joseph P. Kalt, The Role of Constitutions in Native Nation Building: Laying a Firm Foundation, in
REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS 78, 95-96 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007).
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of the various branches of government.” 483
Cultivating and nurturing Mvskoke jurisprudence can be done in a variety of ways.
For example, where relevant, acknowledging and exploring the painful twentieth century
history of the Nation might establish more credibility among both the litigants and the
citizens at large. More references to Mvskoke language and culture would amplify efforts to revitalize the language and instill pride in the youth. 484 The legal history of the
Nation should be documented, taught, and analyzed by citizen-scholars. Collaborations
between language, culture, and law have been promising developments for many tribal
nations in recent years. 485 The government founded and now operates the College of the
Muscogee Nation, which opened in 2004. 486 One of the missions of the College is to
“strengthen the sovereignty of the Muscogee Nation,” a mission consistent with the very
essence of tribal court development. 487 The College will continue to be an ideal forum
for continuing and formalizing Mvskoke-centric intellectual dialogue about politics, law,
and sovereignty.
The fact that Mvskoke governance continues today in spite of many attempts by
European and American forces to annihilate it is a testament to the strength and adaptability of Mvskoke political thought and constitutional principles. The history of Mvskoke
leadership demonstrates the ability of Mvskoke people to advance fundamental principles even in times of great chaos and change. Moving forward, then, the independence of
the court from both local politics and federal oversight is vital. The line of cases decided
by the court in the coming decades will no doubt have a profound impact on the future of
the Nation. 488 As the court presses forward, it will continue to add to the body of case
law that is Mvskoke jurisprudence, a contribution to what U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis called “laboratories of democracy.” Most important, these cases will both
reflect and stimulate an ever-evolving conversation about the way Mvskoke people govern themselves and relate to one another.

486. Ellis II, at 19.
487. Title 27, Section 1-104 explicitly authorizes Mvskoke judges to request the advice of counselors "familiar with . . . [Mvskoke] customs and usages" when deciding issues of Mvskoke common law. MUSCOGEE
(CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 1-104.
488. See, e.g., Gerald Vizenor, Constitutional Consent: Native Traditions and Parchment Rights, in THE
WHITE EARTH NATION: RATIFICATION OF A NATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 9, 62 (2012) (noting that,
“political resistance to the power of executive councils has inspired many Natives to renounce federal corporate
constitutions and create by formal conventions more enlightened democratic systems of Native governance").
486. Clifton Adcock, Tribal College Gaining Ground, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 23, 2009,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Tribal_college_gaining_ground/20090323_11_a13_daniel661791.
487. Tribal
Colleges
and
Universities
(TCUs)
Profiles,
AIHEC,
http://www.aihec.org/colleges/TCUprofiles.cfm (last visited June 9, 2013).
488. A new constitutional reform effort may be initiated. See MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION STRATEGIC PLAN
36-37 (2012) (listing one of the objectives for “Exhibiting Sovereignty” as “[s]ponsor public input into a review and update of the Muscogee Nation Constitution”).

